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INTRODUCTION
Has the right to counsel enabled poor and minority defendants
to shape constitutional criminal procedure doctrine? In the
afterglow of the 1963 decision incorporating the right, Gideon v.
Wainwright,' some hoped that it would. A landmark article
published in the wake of Gideort-an article which came to serve
as the blueprint for the federally funded Neighborhood Legal
Services program-argued that, by giving each indigent criminal
defendant the right to a lawyer, the Court "in effect" gave those
defendants "the power to change the law by objecting to and
eliminating a body of improper practices by police officers,
magistrates, and prosecuting attorneys." 2 The Warren Court
sustained the hope that Gideon had given rise to a new era in
which poor and minority defendants could help "change the law" of
constitutional criminal procedure through decisions involving
indigent defendants that expanded criminal procedure rights and
interpreted those rights in ways designed to redress racial
disparities in the administration of criminal justice.3
Since then, however, constitutional criminal procedure has
taken a conservative turn that is difficult to reconcile with earlier
hopes for how Gideon would impact constitutional lawmaking. 4
1 372 U.S.

335 (1963).
Edgar S. Cahn & Jean C. Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE
L.J. 1317, 1333 n.22 (1964).
2

3

Id.; see also Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties

Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 63 (1996) (noting the connection between poverty concerns
and the Court's holding in Gideon); David Alan Sklansky, Policeand Democracy, 103 MICH.

L. REV. 1699, 1805 (2005) ("[C]riminal procedure in the Warren Court era was famously
preoccupied with issues of illegitimate inequality, particularly those associated with race.");
Mark Tushnet, The Warren Court as History: An Interpretation,in THE WARREN COURT IN
HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE 1, 16 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1993) (describing the
Court's concerns about poverty and race); cf. Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword:
The Coming Crisis of CriminalProcedure,86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1153 (1998) ("Although rarely
couched as such, the unmistakable premise of (the Warren and early-Burger Court criminal
procedure] doctrines was the assumption that communities could not be trusted to police
their own police because of the distorting influence of racism.").
4 See, e.g., THOMAS R. HENSLEY, THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUSTICES, RULINGS, AND
LEGACY 146 tbl.3.9 (2006) (showing the liberal and conservative voting patterns of the
Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts in criminal procedure cases based on the data and
metrics used in HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE ORIGINAL U.S. SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL
The literature
DATABASE (2005), available at http://www.cas.sc.edulpoli/jurilset.htm).
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Legal scholars seeking to explain this shift in criminal procedure
doctrine have largely focused on changes in the Supreme Court's
composition and on the confluence of social, political, and cultural
factors that influence the Court's decisionmaking.5 What emerges
from these examinations is a familiar narrative, in which the
criminal procedure innovations of the Warren Court have been
eclipsed by the decisions of more politically conservative Courts.6
Significantly less attention has been paid, however, to the
economic and institutional considerations that have given the
Court the freedom to implement a largely conservative criminal
procedure agenda and to sever the historical linkages between
constitutional criminal procedure and race.7 One way of exploring
these considerations, and thereby enriching our understanding of
constitutional criminal procedure's doctrinal shifts, is to return to
the question that intrigued scholars and activists in the wake of
Gideon-whether the right to counsel can enable poor and
minority defendants to shape constitutional criminal procedure
examining the nature of this conservative shift-which is particularly pronounced with
regard to the Fourth and Fifth Amendment rules regulating police activity, and the scope of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel-is vast, and a review of the subtleties of the shift is
beyond the scope of this Article. See Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolutionin Constitutional
Criminal Procedure?Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REv. 2466, 2467 n.5 (1996)
(listing significant articles addressing criminal procedure's doctrinal shifts).
See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 270-77

(2009) (describing criminal procedure's doctrinal development and the factors influencing
it); FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND (1970); Louis D. Bilionis, Conservative
Reformation, Popularization,and the Lessons of ReadingCriminalJustice as Constitutional
Law, 52 UCLA L. REV. 979, 989 (2005) (arguing that conservative cultural and political
forces drove the decisionmaking in constitutional criminal cases); Klarman, supranote 3, at
63 (stating that attention to shifting historical attitudes toward poverty is needed to
understand the criminal procedure revolution); Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian

Hero or Zero?Rethinking the Warren Court'sRole in the CriminalProcedureRevolution, 152
U. PA. L. REv. 1361, 1429 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court is influenced by the same
social and political currents that move society).
6 The narratives some scholars offer are more nuanced than this sweeping summary
would suggest. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists,Politics, and CriminalLaw on the
Rehnquist Court, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1043, 1044-46 (2006) (showing that Rehnquist
Court cases interpreting the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee often involved
unusual alignments between liberal and conservative Justices and arguing that the cases
demonstrate "the power of law and legal methodology - and not simply politics - in
Supreme Court decision making").
7 See infranote 44 and accompanying text.
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doctrine-and to identify the material and economic factors that
inform the answer.
This Article examines how the political economy of criminal
litigation-specifically, the material conditions that determine
which litigants have the resources to raise novel criminal
procedure claims, and which of those claims are presented to the
United States Supreme Court-shapes constitutional criminal
procedure. Although political scientists have offered general
accounts of how the political economy of litigation affects
constitutional lawmaking, these accounts do not engage with some
of the basic realities of criminal litigation, including the fact that
almost all criminal defendants are poor and must therefore rely on
the services of court-appointed and state-funded attorneys.8
Consequently, these accounts add little to our understanding of
several of the major doctrinal shifts in constitutional criminal
procedure, including the creation of a constitutional law of state
criminal procedure in the 1920s and 1930s, and the conservative
turn in criminal procedure following the Warren era.
This Article presents a new framework for understanding how
changes in the political economy of litigation contribute to
constitutional criminal procedure's doctrinal shifts. The premise
of the framework is that litigators can influence the Supreme
Court's criminal procedure agenda if they are able to present the
Court with cases that frame a criminal procedure right in a light
favorable to defendants, and can prevent the Court from
considering cases that obscure the value, or foreground the costs,
of the right.9 Yet as the number of organizations representing
indigent defendants increases, those organizations lose most of the
power they once had to control which cases appear on the Court's
criminal procedure docket and are thereby weakened in their
ability to shape the Court's interpretation of a constitutional
criminal procedure right. Thus, as the number of litigators
8 Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregationin CriminalLaw, 95 CAL. L. REV. 383, 398 (2007).

9 Cf. James N. Druckman, Political Preference Formation: Competition, Deliberation,
and the (Ir)relevance of FramingEffects, 98 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 671, 672 (2004) ("Issue
framing effects refer to situations where, by emphasizing a subset of potentially relevant
considerations, a speaker leads individuals to focus on these considerations when
constructing their opinions."); Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L.
REV. 883, 897-98 (2006) (discussing how issue framing can distort judicial decisionmaking).
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increases, the Court gains more freedom to select cases that
present a constitutional question in a way that conforms to the
ideological preferences of the Court's Justices and becomes less
constrained by how supporters of a new constitutional right would
like the right to be framed.
This framework suggests that, paradoxically, the right to
counsel created in Gideon, though essential for indigent
defendants to obtain a fair trial, may have weakened the ability of
those defendants to shape constitutional criminal procedure
The Court's decision in Gideon contributed to an
doctrine.
explosion in the number of organizations devoted to indigent
defense.' 0 Political scientists have credited this explosion with
creating the conditions of possibility for the Warren Court's later
decisions expanding constitutional criminal procedure rights."
These scholars have failed to consider, however, how the explosion
simultaneously increased the Court's freedom to retrench those
rights.
Before Gideon helped transform the political economy of
criminal litigation, the Supreme Court's litigation landscape was
of a type that, this Article argues, gave the criminal defense bar
significant opportunities to shape the criminal procedure agenda
of even a conservative Supreme Court. In the 1920s and 1930s, for
example, the NAACP and a few other organizations could
essentially control which criminal procedure cases involving
Southern racial injustices appeared on the Supreme Court's
docket, since no such cases reached the Court without their

10See infra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
11 See Charles R. Epp, External Pressure and the Supreme Court'sAgenda, in SUPREME
COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 255, 256 (Cornell W.

Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) [hereinafter Epp, ExternalPressure] (arguing that
constitutional litigation is dependent on a "support structure for legal mobilization"); see
also VANESSA A. BAIRD, ANSWERING THE CALL OF THE COURT: How JUSTICES AND LITIGANTS

SET THE SUPREME COURT AGENDA 11 (2007) (asserting that the Court's capacity for creating
legal change is affected by interest group litigation); CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 44-

71 (1998) [hereinafter EPP, RIGHTS REVOLUTION] (describing the concept of a support

structure for legal mobilization).
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assistance. 12 These organizations presented four landmark cases
during this period involving black defendants who suffered
mistreatment in Southern criminal justice systems, and in each of
these cases the Supreme Court reversed state court convictions
and in the process created new constitutional law.'3 Although this
era has recently been characterized as criminal procedure's
"progressive past,"14 the Lochner-era Court that decided these
cases was famously conservative in two important respects.' 5
First, prior to its 1923 decision in Moore v. Dempsey, which
reversed a state court conviction where the trial was conducted
under the threat of mob violence,16 it was not expected that the
Court "would jettison traditional federalism constraints on the
Court's supervision of state criminal proceedings" to come to the
aid of state court defendants.' 7 Second, notwithstanding its
criminal procedure interventions, the Court was one that, as
Michael Klarman argues, "evinced little sensitivity to the plight of
blacks generally." 8 In unanimous decisions, the Court of that era
not only declined to strike down racially restrictive residential
covenants,' 9 but also upheld the constitutionality of public school
12

See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND

THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 156-57 (2004) (noting that the NAACP "provided
essential financial backing and skilled lawyering" for criminal cases).
13 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936) (requiring exclusion of
confessions extracted through torture); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589 (1935)
(prohibiting intentional exclusion of blacks from petit juries); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 71 (1932) (requiring appointment of counsel in capital cases); Moore v. Dempsey, 261
U.S. 86, 90-91 (1923) (holding that mob-dominated trials violate due process).
14 Tracey L. Meares, The ProgressivePast,in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 209, 209-13
(Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).
15 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 873, 876 (1987) (identifying the Lochner period as lasting from 1905 until
the Supreme Court's decision in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)).
16 261 U.S. at 90-91.
17 KLARMAN, supra note 12, at 121; see also RICHARD C. CORTNER, A MOB INTENT ON
DEATH 144-46 (1988) (discussing the Moore Court). Indeed, just eight years prior to its
decision in Moore, the Court had rejected the mob-dominated trial claim of Leo Frank, a
Jewish industrialist who was subsequently lynched. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 338
(1915); see also KLARMAN, supranote 12, at 120-23 (discussing Frankand Moore).
1s Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 48, 53 (2000).
19 Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926). In keeping with its hostility during the
Lochner period toward laws that restricted the right to buy and sell property, the Court
invalidated laws formally requiring residential segregation. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245
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segregation (despite the fact that the petitioners-who were
attacking Mississippi law classifying Chinese students as black for
race classification purposes-did not even raise such a challenge in
their brief).20 Each of the four criminal procedure cases involving
Southern black defendants during this era, however, presented the
Court with horrific and high profile instances of racial injustice,
visited upon defendants who were likely innocent. 21 Thus, by
constructing the Court's criminal procedure agenda through the
cases it selected, impact litigation organizations were able to
influence the creation of new constitutional law by a Court that
was typically conservative with regard to race and federalism
issues.
The litigation conditions that have existed since the Warren
era, however, have given such organizations considerably less
power to counterbalance the ideological preferences of Supreme
Court Justices in criminal procedure cases. Accompanying the
post-Gideon explosion in the number of litigation organizations
available to represent indigent defendants was a boom in the
number of certiorari petitions raising constitutional criminal
procedure claims. 22 This combined growth in the number of
organizations and certiorari petitions weakened the ability of
impact litigation organizations to coordinate with other attorneys
representing indigent defendants, thus rendering them unable to
assume control of cases involving sympathetic criminal
defendants. Moreover, the increase in certiorari filings left the
Court with a vast array of criminal procedure cases to consider for
U.S. 60, 82 (1917); see also KLARMAN, supra note 12, at 143 (noting that segregation
ordinances did not survive legal challenge). These formal rights offered little protection to
blacks, however, given the ubiquity of racially restrictive covenants. See id. at 144-46, 26164 (discussing the success of racially restrictive covenants in systematically excluding
blacks from residing in white neighborhoods). Similarly, although the Court invalidated
laws formally excluding blacks from election primaries, Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89
(1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 541 (1927), it also held there was no state action
when blacks were excluded from Democratic Party primaries because the party limited its
membership to whites. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 53 (1935). This state action
limitation effectively ensured that blacks in the South would remain disenfranchised. See
KLARMAN, supranote 12, at 158 (assessing Grovey and its significance).
20 See Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 85-87 (1927); KLARMAN, supra note 12, at 146-47
(describing the context surrounding the Gong Lum case).
21 See infra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
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review, 23 and has thus given the Court freedom to select those
cases that frame a criminal procedure claim in ways that reinforce
the Justices' preconceived understandings of the issues at stake. 24
Consequently, in constitutional criminal procedure, individual
Justices' preferences determine which cases appear on the Court's
agenda to an even greater degree than in other areas of
constitutional law, where the political economy of litigation gives
impact litigation organizations more control over the certiorari
filing process. 25
In short, the post-Gideon political economy of criminal litigation
has allowed for a Supreme Court criminal docket dominated by
noise. This docket gives the Court's members a freedom they once
lacked to choose cases that obscure the consequences at stake for
sympathetic suspects and defendants when the Court narrows the
scope of a criminal procedure right. 26 Accordingly, to a greater
degree than in the years preceding Gideon, the Court's
interpretations of the Constitution's criminal procedure
guarantees are now developed through, to borrow a phrase of
Justice Frankfurter's, "sordid little case[s]" that are "apt to
obscure the implications of the generalization to which [they]
give[] rise."2 7 Thus, to the extent the Court's decision in Gideon
deserves credit for the birth of the criminal procedure revolution,
it must also be faulted for contributing to its demise.
Part I of this Article presents the background necessary to
reexamine the political economy of criminal litigation. It reviews
the contributions political scientists have made toward
illuminating how the political economy of litigation shapes
constitutional lawmaking, and explains why the framework these
scholars offer is inadequate to address the realities of criminal
defense litigation. Part II then presents a new framework that
reflects these realities, developing three propositions concerning
the role impact litigation organizations play in advancing
constitutional claims on behalf of poor and minority defendants.
23

24

25
26
27

See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 143-70 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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As Part III illustrates by tracing how Gideon helped enable the
conservatism of the current doctrine, these propositions have
considerable explanatory value when they are brought together
and applied to analyze doctrinal shifts in constitutional criminal
procedure. For those who accept that the current doctrine should
be changed (or, regardless of the fairness of the existing doctrine,
think that the Court should be more responsive to the interests of
litigators), this framework sheds light on how to ameliorate the
harm caused by the structural factors underlying these doctrinal
shifts. Accordingly, Part IV illustrates the sort of solutions that
reformers may wish to explore in order to better enable litigators
to influence the Supreme Court's constitutional criminal procedure
agenda.
1. THE LANDSCAPE OF CRIMINAL LITIGATION

Our understanding of constitutional criminal procedure's
doctrinal evolution can be enriched by examining the allocation of
resources available for criminal defense litigators to advance
This is because
particular constitutional arguments.
developments in constitutional doctrine are to a large extent
dependent on the range of cases available for the Supreme Court
to accept for review and on the nature of the arguments litigators
choose to present in those cases. Scholars who have challenged
this view emphasize that the Supreme Court is free to select from
among a seemingly unlimited number of cases raising a federal
constitutional question and to manipulate the arguments
presented in those cases to such a degree that the Court may, for
all practical purposes, "create" a constitutional issue out of thin
air, regardless whether any litigator chose to raise the issue. 28
28 The term for this concept is "issue fluidity."
Kevin T. McGuire & Barbara Palmer,
Issue Fluidityon the U.S. Supreme Court, 87 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 691, 691 (1995); see also S.
Sidney Ulmer, Issue Fluidity in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Conceptual Analysis, in
SUPREME COURT AcTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 319, 322 (Stephen C. Halpern & Charles M.
Lamb eds., 1982) (discussing the existence and application of issue fluidity). The concept is
sometimes illustrated by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961), where the Court
incorporated the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule even though none of the parties
raised the argument. McGuire & Palmer, supra,at 692. It should be noted, however, that
in Mapp the ACLU submitted an amicus brief that, in passing, asked the Court to examine
the incorporation issue. Brief Amici Curiae on Behalf of American Civil Liberties Union &
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This argument disregards, however, the extent to which
Supreme Court Justices consider themselves bound by
institutional norms concerning the issues they are willing to
address and the circumstances under which they are willing to
address them. 29 Among these behavior-constraining norms is a
reluctance on the part of the Justices to tackle a novel
constitutional issue before it has "percolated" in the lower courts.30
The Justices will, in other words, generally wait until the lower
courts have been given sufficient opportunity to address an issue
before they grant certiorari to address it.31 Often, then, there
must be sustained lower-court litigation by individuals motivated
to raise an issue before the Supreme Court will accept it for
review. Accordingly, as Charles Epp has argued, the choice of
cases that the Supreme Court may accept for review is constrained
by the cases that litigators have the resources to bring. 32
For most constitutional issues, the market typically does not
offer sufficient incentives for any single individual to pursue such
sustained litigation. The creation of a new constitutional right is a
public good, the benefits of which are enjoyed by a large
population, but the costs of which are borne by individual
litigants.33 Often, the costs of pursuing a constitutional litigation
strategy that could introduce the Supreme Court to a new
understanding of a constitutional right will substantially outweigh

Ohio Civil Liberties Union at 20, Mapp, 367 U.S. 643 (No. 236); see also STEPHEN L. WASBY,
RACE RELATIONS LITIGATION IN AN AGE OF COMPLEXITY 246 (1995) (discussing how the
ACLU and the Ohio Civil Liberties Union raised the exclusionary issue as one of their
arguments).
29

Cf. Keith E. Whittington, Once More unto the Breach:PostBehavioralistApproaches to

JudicialPolitics,25 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 601, 606-07 (2000) (book review) (discussing the
extent to which "ideological preferences" and the "attitudinal model" influence judicial
decisionmaking).
so H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 230-31 (1991).
31 See id. at 230-34 (describing the norm of "issue percolation"); Epp, ExternalPressure,
supra note 11, at 259 ("[J]ustices have developed an institutionalized reluctance to decide
issues that have been the subject of little sustained litigation in lower courts . . . .").
32 Epp, External Pressure, supra note 11, at 260; cf. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 1-2 (1977) (demonstrating
that, given positive transaction costs, markets will systematically under-provide public
goods).
3 Epp, ExternalPressure,supra note 11, at 260-61.
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the benefits that are gained by any single individual.34
Accordingly, in order for such strategies to be pursued, there must
exist "institutional mechanisms that overcome cost barriers" to
Therefore, "constitutional litigation
individual litigants.35
typically is dependent on a support structurefor legal mobilization,
consisting of lawyers, organizations, and sources of financing, that
makes sustained litigation possible."3 6
The realities of criminal defense litigation, however, complicate
the general account that political scientists have offered of the
political economy of constitutional litigation. Three features of
criminal litigation, in particular, render the prevailing account of
the political economy of constitutional litigation inadequate to
explain how criminal procedure claims come to be litigated. First,
compared to plaintiffs who bring cases in other areas of
constitutional law, the benefit that an individual defendant stands
to gain from a Supreme Court victory-release from prison-is
substantial. These individual defendants will therefore be willing
to spend whatever resources are available to them in order to
pursue a constitutional claim that will allow them to gain their
freedom.37
Second, unlike any other area of constitutional litigation
involving individual rights, the market for criminal defense
litigation is largely under the control of the states. The vast
majority of criminal defendants are poor and, for the most part,
must rely on state-appointed counsel to pursue arguments on their
These attorneys are typically underpaid and
behalf.38
3 Cf. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 98-104 (1974) (explaining that actors with the
financial and organizational capacity to "play for rules," rather than victories in individual
cases, are likely to prevail over time).
35 Epp, ExternalPressure,supranote 11, at 261.
3 Id. at 256.
37 William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy RelationshipBetween CriminalProcedureand Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 31 (1997) ("At least in the many cases where conviction may mean
prison, the stakes in criminal litigation have two critically important characteristics: They
are both extremely large and nonmonetary. The result is a huge wealth effect. If a given
defendant has a million dollars in the bank, he might well find it worthwhile to spend it all
to achieve a successful outcome. . . .").
3 See Garrett, supra note 8, at 398 ("[A]lmost all criminal defendants are indigent and
represented by institutional and repeat player public defenders, who often have severe
resource constraints and thus are incentivized to plea bargain their cases."); see also
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overworked, 39 and even in the best of circumstances are given
fewer resources to litigate a single case than the defendant would
wish to spend. 40 Given their resource constraints, coupled with
their role as repeat players who must maintain their credibility for
the sake of future clients, these attorneys often must ration the
number of arguments they choose to raise in any given case, 41
choosing to pursue some arguments at the expense of others that,
though meritorious, have a lower chance of prevailing. 42
Third, compared to other areas of civil constitutional litigation,
the number of defendants who have an immediate personal
interest in having their rights vindicated is staggeringly high. We
live today in what sociologists have described as an era of mass
imprisonment, where the rate of incarceration is markedly above
any historical norm.43 If even a fraction of the more than 1.6
million individuals currently imprisoned have some judicially
cognizable constitutional grievance concerning the circumstances

CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1
(2000), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdfldccc.pdf (finding that roughly
82% of state defendants and 66% of federal felony defendants are represented by
government-appointed counsel).
39 See NATL RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA'S CONTINUING
NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 52-70 (2009), availableat http://con
stitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf (discussing the insufficient resources and heavy workload
burdening public defenders); STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM.
BAR ASS'N, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE
7-28 (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromis
e/fullreport.pdf (discussing the lack of funding, resources, and excessive caseload for
indigent defense).
40 See Stuntz, supra note 37, at 32 ("For the roughly eighty percent of defendants who
receive appointed defense counsel, the[ir] case is 'worth' whatever price the state sets.").
41 See Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from
Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 810 (2004) (noting the need to limit the
service provided to individual criminal defendants due to overall scarcity of resources).
42 See id. at 810-14 (discussing the rationing of available resources for indigent criminal
defense); Stuntz, supra note 37, at 33-34 (describing shortage of litigation due to lack of
compensation per case and too few resources).
4

See David Garland, Introduction: The Meaning of Mass Imprisonment, in MASS

IMPRISONMENT: SOCIAL CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 1, 1-2 (David Garland ed., 2001)
(noting the dramatic increase in imprisonment rates since 1973); see also BRUCE WESTERN,
PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 24-30 (2006) (surveying data on imprisonment
rates).
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of their arrest and trial, a thriving market for criminal procedure
litigation would-and does xist.4 4
Many of these defendants might have an incentive not only to
raise constitutional claims that are cognizable under the current
doctrine, but also to push for new interpretations of the
Constitution's criminal procedure guarantees that account for race
and class disparities in the administration of criminal justice. 45
Not only are most criminal defendants poor, 46 but sociologists have
identified something approaching the systematic imprisonment of
a segment of the national population: young, black males in urban
centers. 47 These race and class disparities intersect to concentrate
4 See HEATHER C. WEST ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2009, at 1 (2009),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p09.pdf (stating that 1,613,740 sentenced
prisoners were incarcerated in state or federal prison at year-end 2009).
45 There is a vast literature addressing the respects in which both contemporary equal
protection and criminal procedure doctrine fail to protect against race and class
discrimination in the criminal justice system. See, e.g., DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT
AND INNOCENCE: THE ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT, AND FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE (2003); Stuntz, supranote 37, at 50-51 (describing racially disparate impact of
criminal justice law and policies). For example, the Fourth Amendment, as it is currently
interpreted, permits law enforcement officers to make racially motivated decisions about
whom to stop, search, and arrest, provided that the government can later demonstrate that,
irrespective of the officer's intent, the action was objectively reasonable. Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). Likewise, the current doctrine's definition of what
constitutes a "reasonable" privacy expectation on the part of a suspect extends considerable
protection to educated and middle-class suspects, but systematically undervalues the
privacy rights of the poor. See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal
Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 798 (2006) ("Expectations are deemed reasonable when they
conform to existing social arrangements - people in houses enjoy more Fourth Amendment
protection than apartment dwellers (who in turn enjoy more than the homeless), suspects in
cars are better protected than suspects who use public transportation, and the list goes
on."); see also Craig Bradley, The Middle Class FourthAmendment, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
1123, 1125 (2003) (noting a lack of protection for suspects in police custody); David Cole,
Scalia'sKind of Privacy, NATION, July 23, 2001, at 6-7 (discussing extent to which Fourth
Amendment doctrine privileges home owners); Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception
to the Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA. L. REV. 391, 400-01 (2003) (noting that the Court's
definition of "expectation of privacy" accords greater protection for individuals who are more
well-off); William J. Stuntz, The DistributionofFourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 1265, 1269-71 (1999) (describing the disparate impact of Fourth Amendment
doctrine on the less wealthy).
46 See supranote 38 and accompanying text.
47 See WESTERN, supra note 43, at 24-30 (disaggregating rates of incarceration based on
race, sex, and education levels); Garland, supranote 43, at 1-2 (arguing that imprisonment
is "normalized" for young black males in urban centers). Current prison statistics
powerfully illustrate the extent to which African-Americans, and especially poor AfricanAmericans, are more likely than whites to become defendants in the criminal justice
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the burdens of incarceration among the most socially
disadvantaged groups of individuals.4 8 The effects of these
disparities in incarceration rates are not exclusively borne by
convicted defendants, since the disparities reinforce stereotypes
that lead law enforcement officers to disproportionately target
young, black males for stops and searches. 49
system. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics for 2009, black men in the United
States are about 6.4 times more likely to be incarcerated than white men. See WEST ET AL.,
supra note 44, at 28 app. tbl.15 (documenting the number of black prisoners per 100,000
black persons in the United States general population and the number of white prisoners
per 100,000 white persons in the general population, for prisoners serving more than a year
behind bars under state or federal jurisdiction). The discrepancy is even wider among men
under forty. For example, about 7.7% of black men aged 30 to 34 were serving at least one
year behind bars in 2009, compared to approximately 1.2% of white men in the same age
group. Id. Overall, black Americans constitute only about 12.9% of the general population,
and blacks and Latinos together constitute about 28.4%. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2011, at 10 tbl.6, available at http://www.ce
nsus.gov/prod/2011pubs/llstatab/pop.pdf (showing a total population of 307,007,000 and,
counting individuals who identify as only one race, a black population of 39,641,000, and
Hispanic population of 47,655,000). However, 38.2% of convicted felons serving more than a
year behind bars are black, and 58.9% of convicted felons serving more than a year behind
bars are either black or Latino. WEST ET AL., supranote 44, at 27 app. tbl.12.
These discrepancies cannot entirely be explained by differences in crime rates among
different racial groups. For example, approximately 45.3% of those incarcerated in state
prison for drug offenses in 2008 were black and about 27.2% were white. See id. at 30 app.
tbl.16c (showing total number of inmates incarcerated under state jurisdiction for drug
offenses as 251,400, the number of black inmates as 113,900, and the number of white
inmates as 68,300). The racial makeup of American drug users, however, was relatively
balanced at 9.6%black and 8.8% white. See 2 SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS.
ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., RESULTS FROM THE 2009 NATIONAL
SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH, at tbl.G.11 (2010), available at http://www.oas.samhsa.
(documenting respondents over
gov/NSDUHI/2k9NSDUHI2k9ResultsApps.htm#TabG.1
twelve years of age who had used illegal drugs in the previous month). Admittedly, this
data provides an incomplete picture of the extent of racial bias in the enforcement of drug
laws. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARv. L. REV. 1969, 1976 (2008)
("[W]e know, at least roughly, the number of black and white drug users, but no one knows
the numbers and locations of black and white drug dealers.. . ."). It does illustrate,
however, tremendous racial disparities in who is most likely to require criminal procedure
protections.
48 For example, almost 60% of black men born in the late 1960s who had dropped out of
high school had served time in prison for a felony before they were thirty-five years old.
WESTERN, supra note 43, at 26-27 fig.1.4. By contrast, among men of the same age cohort,
just over 11% of white men who had dropped out of high school, and less than 5% of collegeeducated black men, had served time in prison before age thirty-five. Id.
4 In New York City, for example, approximately 80% of the police stops that occurred
between 2005 and 2008 were of blacks and Latinos (who together comprise 53% of the city's
population), while only 10% were of whites (who comprise 40% of the city's population).
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Speculating from these demographics of incarceration, one
might presume there exists a robust marketplace for novel
constitutional arguments on behalf of poor and minority
to reshape
arguments
intended
defendants, including
constitutional criminal procedure doctrine so that it provides a
meaningful check on racially discriminatory law enforcement
practices. Under the account of the political economy of litigation
that other scholars have offered, the conditions necessary for such
a marketplace to exist would seem to be present within the current
landscape of criminal defense litigation-a landscape populated
with a vast number of defendants who might wish to advance such
arguments and a wide (albeit underfunded) "support structure for
legal mobilization," consisting of legal aid organizations across the
country to litigate on those defendants' behalves.50 This Article
suggests, however, that this vast (but not deep) support structure
for legal mobilization may actually weaken the market for such
novel arguments.

CTR. FOR CONSTL RIGHTS, RACIAL DISPARITY IN NYPD STOP-AND-FRISKS: THE CENTER FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PRELIMINARY REPORT ON UF-250 DATA FROM 2005 THROUGH JUNE

2008, at 4 (2009), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/ReportCCR-NYPDStop-andFris
k_0.pdf. Moreover, blacks accounted for 85%of all individuals who were frisked during that
period, while whites accounted for just 8% of these individuals. Id. Of all the stops that
were made during this period, only 2.6% resulted in the discovery of a weapon or
contraband. Id.
Although young black men in urban centers are the group most likely to be targeted for
such racial profiling, the burdens of this practice are not exclusively borne by the
educationally disadvantaged-a group whose lifetime risk of imprisonment increased in the
last decades of the twentieth century. WESTERN, supra note 43, at 27. The burdens are
also borne by better educated black men, whose lifetime risk of imprisonment actually
declined during that period. Id. at 28. As David Cole has observed, "[mi]any people cannot
tell whether an African-American is a dropout or college-educated - or, more relevant, a
burglar or a college professor, as Harvard professor Henry Louis Gates found in July
2009...." David Cole, Can Our Shameful Prisons Be Reformed?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Nov.
19, 2009, at 41. Thus, "[t]he correlation of race and crime in the public's mind reinforces
prejudice that affects every African-American." Id.; see also PAUL BUTLER, LET'S GET FREE:
A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 19 (2009) (offering an African-American law professor's
first-hand account of the stigma he suffered when arrested and tried for a crime he did not
commit); David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While
Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REv. 265, 265 (1999) (documenting instances in which middleaged African-Americans are targeted for racial profiling).
50 Epp, External Pressure,supra note 11, at 256 (emphasis omitted).
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II. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CRIMINAL LITIGATION
Generalizing from the realities described above, this Part
presents a theoretical framework for understanding the political
economy of criminal litigation and the role it plays in shaping
The framework
constitutional criminal procedure doctrine.
proceeds in three steps, each of which fleshes out a separate
proposition about the nature of criminal defense litigation on
behalf of poor and minority individuals (who, as explained above,51
constitute the vast majority of criminal defendants). First, impact
litigation organizations, 52 by virtue of their resources and
institutional missions, are better positioned than most state court
attorneys who represent indigent defendants to raise novel
constitutional arguments on those defendants' behalves. Second,
by virtue of their ability to choose clients whose cases frame a
constitutional claim in the best possible light, impact litigation
organizations have an advantage over even paid criminal defense
attorneys in persuading the Supreme Court to accept novel
constitutional arguments. Third, the extent to which an impact
litigation organization can influence the Supreme Court's
constitutional criminal procedure agenda-as opposed to simply
present cases that provide the Court with an opportunity to
advance a preexisting agenda-depends on the number of other
litigants in the field.
A. IMPACT LITIGATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL STRATEGY

In a world of limited resources for indigent defense services,
impact litigation organizations play an important role in
generating new understandings of constitutional criminal
procedure that might not otherwise get litigated. Two reasons, one
obvious and one subtle, account for this role. The obvious reason
is that, as addressed above, the vast majority of criminal

See supranote 47 and accompanying text.
For purposes of this Article, an "impact litigation organization" may be understood as
an organization that uses litigation to "seek systemic relief applied to many people."
Deborah M. Weissman, Gender-Based Violence as JudicialAnomaly: Between "The Truly
Nationaland the Truly Local," 42 B.C. L. REV. 1081, 1130 n.268 (2001).
51
52
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defendants are poor. 53 They therefore cannot self-finance a
constitutional litigation campaign likely to capture the attention of
the Supreme Court, much less coordinate with other defendants to
pursue a strategy across a number of cases pushing for a new
understanding of a right. In 2004, for example, the Court granted
3% of the 2,041 certiorari petitions that litigants filed through
their attorneys. 54 This success rate, while low, is stunning when
compared to the mere 0.2% of the 6,543 certiorari petitions filed in
forma pauperis that the Supreme Court granted that year.55
The second, and subtler, reason is that, without the resources
necessary to coordinate with others, attorneys representing
indigent defendants and acting in the defendants' best interests
have little incentive to advance novel constitutional arguments on
their clients' behalves.5 6 The principal aim of most defendants is
to avoid a conviction, not reshape constitutional doctrine.57
Arguments that have the best chance of achieving this goal are
ones that a defendant's counsel can frame squarely within existing
precedent, thus allowing a trial court judge to rule in the
defendant's favor on the most doctrinally conservative ground.5 8
Assuming that the defendant's attorney is constrained in the
number of constitutional claims practical to raise,59 it is in the
defendant's interest to forgo novel doctrinal claims in order to
pursue more conventional ones (provided that conventional claims
are not foreclosed by the facts of the case). 60 Accordingly, even
5 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
5 LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS AND
DEVELOPMENTS 75 tbl.2-6 (4th ed. 2007).
65
56

Id.
Cf. Margareth Etienne, The Ethics of Cause Lawyering: An EmpiricalExaminationof

Criminal Defense Lawyers as Cause Lawyers, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1195, 1208-23

(2005) (documenting the array of concerns that motivate criminal defense attorneys in
reality).
67 For simplicity's sake, this statement leaves aside plea bargaining considerations.
58 See KLARMAN, supranote 12, at 460-61 (contrasting the incentives of black defendants
in the 1950s to "rais[e] the narrowest possible objections" with the NAACP's broader goals
in representing the defendants).
59 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
6o It is also likely in the interest of the defendant's attorney to pursue the more
conventional strategy. As repeat players in the judicial system, public defenders are
interested in preserving their credibility in the eyes of judges and prosecutors, and do not
want to be seen as making gratuitously frivolous claims. See Etienne, supra note 56, at
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when a class of poor defendants would benefit from advancing a
novel constitutional claim, none of the defendants is likely to bring
that claim on an individual basis.
These defendants may each be better off, however, if an impact
litigation organization enabled them to overcome their
coordination problems and raise the novel claim. To illustrate:
imagine that 100 indigent minority defendants are each arrested
following pretextual traffic stops. In each case, the officer
objectively could have had reasonable suspicion to conduct the
stop; but in reality, each of the stops occurred only because the
officer engaged in racial profiling. In each case, the officer
questioned the defendant for some time and, after eventually
eliciting statements that provided probable cause, arrested the
defendant, searched the vehicle, and discovered contraband.
Assume that any one of the defendants in this stylized
hypothetical can allocate his scarce resources (the time and energy
of his lawyer) to pursuing one of two strategies.61 In "Strategy A,"
which has only a 1%chance of success, the defendant argues that,
irrespective of whether the officer engaged in profiling, the traffic
stop was objectively unreasonable in its duration. 62 In this
strategy the defendant is presenting a claim that is weak, but fits
within existing precedent. The small chance of this approach
succeeding lies with the trial court's assessment of the facts, and
there is no chance of reversing an adverse trial court decision on
appeal.63 In "Strategy B," the defendant argues that racially
motivated traffic stops violate the Fourth Amendment. This
argument is foreclosed by Whren v. United States, which held that
a law enforcement officer's subjective intentions in pulling over a
suspect "play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
1245 (describing the daily balance public defenders must make between their clients'
interests and their own).
61 For simplicity's sake, this hypothetical is framed from the perspective of a
decisionmaking defendant. It is irrelevant, however, whether it is the defendant or (more
plausibly) the defendant's attorney who is pushing a particular course of action.
6 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-27 (1968) (holding that a stop to search for weapons,
without probable cause, must be narrowly tailored to the exigencies of the situation);
Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005) (holding that an initially constitutional seizure
can become unlawful if prolonged unreasonably).
6 See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963) (holding that trial courts should determine
the reasonableness of a search based on the facts of the case).
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Amendment analysis."64 Imagine, however, that if the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in the case, there is a 45% chance it would
decide to overrule Whren and hold that racially motivated traffic
stops violate the Fourth Amendment. 65
Consider which of these strategies a defendant would wish to
pursue under two different scenarios. In the first scenario
(SCENARIO 1), the defendant is represented by appointed counsel.
While the appointed counsel is willing to zealously represent his
client before the trial court, and even through a frivolous appeal,66
- 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).

This 45% probability is stipulated in order to emphasize the potential that impact
litigation organizations have to influence the Supreme Court in close cases. The probability
is not, however, intended to be fanciful. Although the Court's holding in Whren was
unanimous, the consensus among the Justices concerning the relevance of racial profiling to
Fourth Amendment analysis appeared to later dissolve in ways that cannot be reliably
traced along any simple ideological axis.
Specifically, one year after Whren, Justice Kennedy dissented from an opinion holding
that an officer may order a passenger who is not suspected of a crime to exit a vehicle for
the duration of a traffic stop. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 422 (1997) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). In doing so, Justice Kennedy wrote that "[w]hen Whren is coupled with today's
holding, the Court puts tens of millions of passengers at risk of arbitrary control by the
police," and further cautioned that "[i]f the command to exit [that the Court majority
sanctioned] were to become commonplace, the Constitution would be diminished in a most
public way." Id. at 423. Later, however, Justice Kennedy joined a 5-4 opinion written by
Justice Souter holding that the Fourth Amendment permitted the warrantless arrest of a
woman for failing to wear a seatbelt, a misdemeanor offense punishable only by a fine.
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 322-23 (2001). Dissenting from that opinion,
Justice O'Connor (joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer) argued that, "as
the . .. debate over racial profiling demonstrates all too clearly, a relatively minor traffic
infraction may often serve as an excuse for stopping and harassing an individual." Id. at
360, 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Moreover, in Arkansas v. Sullivan, Justice Ginsburg
authored a concurrence joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Breyer expressing
concern with the Whren rule that an officer's subjective motivations for conducting a stop
are irrelevant for Fourth Amendment purposes, and suggesting a willingness to revisit that
holding. See Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772-73 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)
(expressing reservations about unduly broad police discretion). Throwing any effort to votecount an overruling of Whren into further confusion, Justice O'Connor later joined an
opinion for the Court written by Justice Kennedy holding that the suspicionless questioning
of bus passengers does not violate the Fourth Amendment, while Justice Souter joined
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg (but not Justice O'Connor) in dissent. United States v.
Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 196 (2002). Given these voting alignments, there were, at least prior
to the appointments of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, possibly three potential
swing votes for a case with attractive facts in which the petitioners urge the Court to
overrule Whren.
6 Cf. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (permitting an attorney to file a
motion to withdraw from a case if there are no meritorious issues to appeal).
65
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the attorney is unwilling to file a certiorari petition on the
defendant's behalf.67 Therefore, if the defendant decides to pursue
Strategy B up to the Supreme Court, he will be required to file an
in forma pauperis certiorari petition that (consistent with the
current statistical trends) would stand only a 0.2% chance of being
granted. 68 Accordingly, the overall odds of success for a defendant
who wishes to pursue Strategy B is 0.09%.69 Therefore, as
illustrated in the table below, the defendant must choose between
Strategy A, which has a 1%chance of success, or Strategy B, which
has less than a 0.1% chance of success. Given this choice, any
rational defendant with complete information would accept his
lawyer's advice to pursue Strategy A.
SCENARIO 1
Strategy A
Conventional constitutional argument;
stitution acertiorari
Conventional
no certiorari petition.foapuprs
1% Chance of Success

Strategy B
Novel constitutional argument;
petition must be filed in
forma pauperis.
0.09% Chance of Success

Now imagine an alternative scenario (SCENARIO 2) where the

1% chance of success for Strategy A remains the same for each
defendant, as does the 45% chance that the Supreme Court would
reverse Whren if it granted the certiorari petition of a defendant
pursuing Strategy B. In this scenario, however, an impact
litigation organization comes along and-before any of the
67 This could happen for a number of reasons.
The attorney may, for example, be
forbidden by the state's public defender statute or policy from filing a certiorari petition, or
may not be compensated for doing so. See NAT'L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., supra note 39,
at 80-83 (discussing the underfunding of appellate defenders). Or the attorney may simply
choose not to file a frivolous certiorari petition due to resource constraints. See Giovanna
Shay & Christopher Lasch, Initiating a New Constitutional Dialogue: The Increased
Importance Under AEDPA of Seeking Certiorarifrom Judgments of State Courts, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 211, 251, 255-56 (2008) (noting that certain states prohibit public defenders
from filing certiorari petitions or do not provide funding for those attorneys who do and
listing the states that exercise such practices). See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying
text.
68 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
69That is, the probability that the defendant's petition will be granted (0.002), times the
probability that the Supreme Court will rule in the defendant's favor (0.45) equals 0.0009.
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defendants have committed to either Strategy-announces that it
is willing to represent one of the 100 defendants who wishes to
pursue Strategy B. Although the odds of success before the
Supreme Court on the merits remain 45%, assume that (again,
consistent with current trends) there is now a 3% chance that the
Supreme Court will grant the defendant's certiorari petition,
which is now filed through counsel. 70 The odds of such a defendant
prevailing in Strategy 2 are now (again drawing from current
statistical trends) 1.35%.71 As the table below illustrates, the
defendant's odds of success are now greater by pursuing Strategy
B. Accordingly, it would be in any of the 100 defendants' interest
to pursue Strategy B and agree to have an impact litigation
organization pursue a novel constitutional argument on his
behalf. 72
SCENARIO 2
Strategy A
Conventional constitutional argument;
no certiorari petition.
1% Chance of Success

Strategy B
Novel constitutional argument; in
forma pauperis certiorari petition.
1.35% Chance of Success

B. IMPACT LITIGATION AND HEURISTICS

This only tells part of the story, however. Thus far, the
hypothetical shows only that a defendant who can afford to hire an
attorney would have an incentive to pursue a novel constitutional
70 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. Although this hypothetical stipulates that
the odds of the petition being granted will mirror the actual grant rates of certiorari
petitions in 2004, this is merely a simplifying assumption. The assumed odds fail to reflect
the likelihood that, in reality, the certiorari petitions that are filed through counsel contain
a greater percentage of meritorious claims than the petitions filed pro se. Accordingly, the
assumed odds may overstate the extent to which the claims raised in a typical pro se
certioari petition would be granted review if they were presented in a petition filed through
counsel.
71That is, the probability that the defendant's petition will be granted (0.03), times the
probability that the Supreme Court will rule in the defendant's favor (0.45) equals 0.0135.
72 In this hypothetical, it is assumed that each defendant will learn whether he will
receive the organization's assistance before having to commit to pursuing either Strategy A
or Strategy B. Otherwise, the probability of a defendant succeeding by pursing Strategy B
would have to be discounted by the likelihood that the organization will decide not to
represent him.
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strategy, while an indigent defendant does not. An impact
litigation organization, however, is typically better positioned than
a paid attorney to present novel arguments to the Supreme Court,
because it has more control over the facts in which it frames its
Simply put, this is because impact litigation
arguments.
organizations can select sympathetic defendants.
More specifically, impact litigation organizations can choose
cases and facts that best frame the argument they are trying to
make. Like any decisionmaker trying to assess the consequences
of creating a new rule based on limited information, the Supreme
Court's assessment will be skewed to some degree by the
availability heuristic, which may be defined as "the tendency of
individuals to overestimate the likelihood that an event will occur
when an example of that event comes readily to mind."73 When a
court is deciding whether to create a new constitutional rule, the
facts that will come most readily to the judges' minds will, in all
likelihood, be the facts of the case before them. 74
An impact litigation organization can harness the availability
heuristic by selecting the case whose facts best frame its claim. In
our hypothetical, the impact litigation organization would try to
use the most sympathetic defendant to reshape the doctrine. If
each of the 100 defendants in our hypothetical acts in his selfinterest and offers to pursue Strategy B in exchange for receiving
the organization's assistance, the organization will have 100
defendants from which to choose. Perhaps the organization will
choose a defendant whose crime carries low social stigma (say,

73

Jonathan S. Masur, ProbabilityThresholds, 92 IOWA L. REv. 1293, 1341 (2007); see also

Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 163, 163-65
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (explaining how the availability heuristic shapes public
perception); Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation,
51 STAN. L. REv. 683, 712 (1999) (analyzing the role of the availability heuristic in the
public's perception of loss); Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implicationsof Cognitive
Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 771 (1990) (noting that the
For
availability heuristic causes policymakers to overweigh low probability events).
example, a record snowstorm that recently hit a city may leap into the mind of a city
manager trying to decide how much to invest in snow removal equipment and lead the
manager to spend more than the data would warrant.
74 See Schauer, supranote 9, at 885-86 (discussing heuristic biases that lead the facts of
particular cases to influence judges' articulations of generally applicable legal rules).

744

GEORGIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 45:721

marijuana possession) and reject a defendant whose crime is
widely condemned (say, possession of child pornography). The
organization may instead decide to take the case of a young, firsttime offender with a promising academic record, or perhaps it will
choose an accomplished, middle-aged professional whose
biography defies any negative racial stereotypes that the Justices
might (perhaps subconsciously) hold. Whomever the organization
chooses, its victory will create a precedent that will ultimately
benefit each of the 100 defendants (or, at least, future defendants
of the same race who are the targets of racial profiling), and it is
therefore in almost everyone's interest to have the organization
choose the most sympathetic defendant.
The organization's selection of a sympathetic defendant, it is
safe to assume, will increase the likelihood that the Supreme
Court will rule in the defendant's favor should it choose to grant
certiorari.75 Perhaps these intangibles will be so crucial to the
success of the case that they would boost the defendant's chances
above 50%, making the litigation an attractive investment from
the organization's perspective. More importantly, the freedom to
75 One could argue an impact litigation organization's use of sympathetic defendants
would distort the Supreme Court's regulatory decisionmaking by causing the Court to
overvalue those defendants' rights over the interests of law enforcement. Cf. Frederick
Schauer &Richard Zeckhauser, The Trouble with Cases 20 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 15279, 2009), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl5279
(discussing availability heuristic bias caused by use of sympathetic plaintiffs in civil cases).
In the context of adjudicating criminal procedure rights, however, the use of a sympathetic
defendant may serve two important functions. First, insofar as the structure of criminal
procedure litigation causes judges to overestimate reliability of police officers' judgments,
see Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner,Out in the Street: Consideringthe Characterof
the Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIo ST. L.J. 99, 137 n.114
(1999) ("Mhe structure of criminal procedure law creates an availability heuristic .. . by
exposing courts primarily to criminal cases in which police intuition proved accurate. . . ."),
sympathetic defendants might serve a debiasing function. By using a sympathetic
defendant, a litigator can harness the availability bias to make a judge overvalue the
defendant's interests to the same degree that the judge overvalues law enforcement's
interests. Cf. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, DebiasingThrough Law, 35 J. LEGAL
STUD. 199, 199-201 (2006) (discussing the availability heuristic's potential as a debiasing
device). Second, to the extent that criminal procedure rights such as the right to counsel
are predicated on the inherent dignity of the individual, see DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS
AND HUMAN DIGNITY (2007) (arguing this point), there may be cognitive value in
considering the importance of these rights from the perspective of the most sympathetic
defendant, knowing that more unsavory individuals are to be accorded the same level of
respect.
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select among its clients leaves the organization better positioned
than a profit-maximizing attorney to urge the Court to adopt a
new constitutional interpretation.
C. IMPACT LITIGATION AND AGENDA CONTROL

As the first two steps of this framework establish, impact
litigation organizations are well-positioned to litigate cases that
present the Court with information concerning poor and minority
defendants. The ability of these organizations to actually get their
cases heard by the Court is a different matter.76 Although the
Supreme Court is dependent on litigants to raise certain
constitutional arguments, this constraint means very little if there
is a large set of litigants (and litigation organizations) raising
almost every imaginable argument, framed in almost every
imaginable way.7 7 Since the passage of the Judiciary Act of 1925,78
76 With respect to the political economy of criminal procedure litigation, this point has
largely been overlooked. Tracing the political economy of litigation from the 1930s through
the 1960s, Charles Epp has persuasively argued that the Warren-era criminal procedure
revolution is, in large part, attributable to the growth in the number of organizations
litigating on behalf of defendants. See EPP, RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 11, at 44-71.
This account of the political economy of litigation does little to explain, however, what role
(if any) these organizations played in later eras, when the Supreme Court's criminal
procedure jurisprudence had, on the balance, gotten more conservative. See supra note 4
and accompanying text.
More recently, a political scientist has argued that, between 1953 and 1995, Supreme
Court litigants brought cases in response to language that Justices slip into their opinions
that signal their interest in deciding certain issues. BAIRD, supra note 11, at 55-56.
Significantly, however, the regression analyses that Baird uses to support this claim fail to
show a statistically significant relationship between the independent variables she uses
("indicators" or "signals" of the Supreme Court's priorities) and the number of criminal
justice cases brought in the years following the indicator. See id. at 100 fig.4.4 (showing
lower bound of a 95% confidence interval at zero at year four, falling below zero at all other
years). Furthermore, the R-squared for Baird's regression of criminal justice cases is far
lower than that for any other area of law except federalism. Id. at 100-01 fig.4.4. Compare,
for example, the variance explained by judicial signals in the outcomes of economic
regulation cases (R2 = .59) or First Amendment cases (R2 = .55) to the variance explained by
2
judicial signals in the outcomes of criminal justices cases (R = 0.16). Id. Such disparities
make sense, however, when one steps back to consider the resources and coordination
abilities of litigants in these different areas of law.
77This is the insight underlying "attitudinalist" judging models in political science, which
hold that Supreme Court decisionmaking is influenced by little beyond the ideological (or
"attitudinal") predispositions of the Justices. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH,
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). While this Article
neither defends nor endorses the attitudinal model, this scholarship highlights reasons to
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before most of the landmark constitutional criminal procedure
cases reversing state court convictions, 79 the Supreme Court has
had the power to control its own docket through the certiorari
process and the freedom to accept whatever cases it chooses.80 The
cases it accepts are typically ones where each side can offer
plausible legal arguments, and the Justices are free, if they are so
inclined, to accept whichever arguments that conform to their
ideological preferences,81 institutional interests, 82 or whatever
other factors motivate them.
Thus, in order to reshape the Supreme Court's constitutional
understandings, an organization must operate in an area of law
where the number of arguments being presented to the Court is
limited. 83 As explained above, constitutional litigation is a public
good, and therefore requires the existence of institutions with the
be skeptical that the Supreme Court's decisionmaking agenda is constrained by the
arguments raised by litigants irrespective of the political economy of litigation.
78 Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936 (1925).
79 Cf. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90-91 (1923) (holding that a trial dominated by a
"mob" such that there was "actual interference with the course of justice" is without due
process). Prior to Moore v. Dempsey, the Court had reversed state criminal convictions only
a few times, each on account of racial discrimination in the jury selection. See Rogers v.
Alabama, 192 U.S. 226, 229, 231 (1904) (reversing a state murder conviction where AfricanAmericans were systematically excluded from the grand jury on account of race); Carter v.
Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 448-49 (1900); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1880); Strauder v.
West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 312 (1879).
80 Edward A. Hartnett, QuestioningCertiorari:Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years After
the Judges' Bill, 100 COLuM. L. REV. 1643, 1644 (2000). In 1988, Congress largely
eliminated the Supreme Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction. Act of June 27, 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662; see also Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for
Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 50-53 (2009) (describing the historical scope of
the Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction).
81 See Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down:A Critiqueof Interpretivismand
Neutral Principles,96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 793 (1983) (suggesting that lawyers "minimize
significant bodies of conflicting or complicating evidence in service of their partisan goals");
SEGAL &SPAETH, supranote 77, at 86 (introducing and defining the attitudinal model). In
claiming that Supreme Court Justices have the power to decide cases according to their
ideological preferences, I am not suggesting that the Justices inevitably choose to exercise
that power. Cf. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1766 (1976) (arguing that because of the indeterminacy of legal
principles "there is simply no way for the judge to be neutral").
82 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 TermForeword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 28-29 (1994) (discussing the role of
institutional interaction in Supreme Court decisionmaking).
8 Cf. WASBY, supranote 28, at 157-61 (describing control over the cases being filed as a
necessary feature of planned litigation).
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resources and organizational capacity to overcome coordination
problems.84 If one organization has a monopoly over a particular
subarea of constitutional litigation, then that organization will be
responsible for at least half of the arguments that are presented to
the Supreme Court in that subarea (with the parties it litigates
against being responsible for the other half). The Supreme Court
Justices will doubtless receive information from other sources,
such as the media, law clerks, scholars, and amici curiae, that will
shape their constitutional understandings in that subarea. 85 The
monopoly organization, however, will dominate the most
important channel for raising arguments: the litigation process
itself. Similarly, if there exist only a few organizations that
coordinate with one another, and thus form an oligopoly with
respect to an area of litigation, those organizations will be able to
control how constitutional arguments are presented to the Court
in the litigation process. If, however, there are a multitude of
organizations that are active players in a subarea of constitutional
litigation, then the sources of information available to the
Supreme Court Justices will be multitudinous. Accordingly, if
countless organizations supply the Court with a virtually
unlimited array of constitutional understandings, then whatever
influence any single organization had on the Justices'
constitutional understandings will likely be displaced by a range of
other norms and constraints that influence constitutional
decisionmaking.
In criminal cases, moreover, an increase in the number of
litigation organizations will not only diminish those organizations'
influence over the Supreme Court's agenda, but also strengthen
the Government's influence. First, more organizations available to
represent poor and indigent defendants will, it is assumed, result
in more victories for those defendants at the trial and intermediate

"ISee supranotes

32-36 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements Change (or Fail to Change) the
Constitution: The Case of the New Departure, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27, 33-34 (2005)
(discussing role of media and other elite opinion in shaping judges' constitutional
understandings); Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Mapping Out the Strategic Terrain: The
85

Informational Role of Amici Curiae,

in

SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING:

NEW

INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES, supra note 11, at 215 (assessing the influence of amici
curiae on Supreme Court decisionmaking).
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appellate levels. Accompanying such an increase is a rise in
Government opportunities to file certiorari petitions in cases that,
notwithstanding an adverse decision below, frame a criminal
procedure question in a manner favorable to prosecutors. Second,
while the number of organizations devoted to representing
defendants may swell in response to political and economic shifts,
the number of federal and state governments is relatively stable.
Hence, as the number of organizations increases, states (and the
federal government) will be relatively better positioned to
coordinate with each other to control which Government petitions
will be filed. Finally, for a prosecutor, the professional duty to
zealously represent one's clients does not entail an obligation to
file appeals that, in the prosecutor's estimation, will make bad
law. 86 Accordingly, prosecutors may have greater discretion than
their defense-attorney counterparts to file only those certiorari
petitions that are likely to advance a broad constitutional
agenda.87 In summary, an increase in the number of organizations
representing defendants will increase the Government's
opportunities to file certiorari petitions without significantly
impairing its ability to control which petitions are filed.
Thus, in order to reshape the Supreme Court's constitutional
understandings, an organization should try to dominate that
subarea of constitutional litigation. Accordingly, if an organization
seeks to pursue a sustained litigation strategy to advance a new
interpretation of the constitution, the organization must be able to
control the litigation process.88 There are two interrelated,

8 Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT scope, cmt. 18 (2010) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES] (discussing scope of government attorneys' authority to appeal under the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct).
87 See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal CriminalLaw?, 110 HARV. L. REV.
469, 480 (1996) ("By paying close attention to the facts of the cases they select as vehicles
for novel statutory readings, federal prosecutors can highlight the benefits and suppress the
costs of the interpretations that they favor.").
88 See WASBY, supra note 28, at 157-61 (describing control as an element of "planned
litigation"). A strategy of planned litigation can be broadly defined as a strategy that
"entails focus on a particular area of law; pursuit of many cases in sequence and thus the
choice ofcases to bring; control of development and progress of those cases; and strategy, at
least in a general sense." Id. at 144-45. The exemplar of a planned litigation strategy is,
unsurprisingly, the NAACP-LDFs school desegregation campaign which led to the decision
in Brown v. Boardof Education,347 U.S. 483 (1954). WASBY, supranote 28, at 142-43.
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structural prerequisites for an organization to have the ability to
maintain such control.
First, there must be a manageable
number of cases being filed in the area of law that the organization
is seeking to change, so that the organization is one of the few
voices that the Supreme Court Justices hear.89 Second, the
organization must be able to coordinate its efforts with any other
organizations or individuals involved in the litigation "to assure
that only the best cases -

in the most advantageous order -

Court."90

reach the high
Ultimately, this framework does not purport to expose a grand
causal link between the nature of criminal litigation and the shape
of constitutional doctrine. However, to the extent that it is rooted
in assumptions that do more to reflect the realities of modern
criminal procedure than to distort it, the framework can enrich our
understanding of the influences that shape constitutional criminal
procedure.9 ' It sheds light, for example, on the extent to which the
89 The paucity of cases brought in the area of school desegregation before the NAACP
began its school desegregation campaign, for example, enabled the organization to control
the cases it chose to bring. See JAMES PATTERSON, BROWN V. BOARD OFEDUCATION: A CIVIL

RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 15-16 (2006) (explaining that the NAACP's

desegregation efforts between 1936 and 1938 were focused on Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 352 (1938) (holding, in the first school desegregation case brought
before the Supreme Court by the NAACP, that University of Missouri Law School had to
admit a black student's law school application where it had no separate law school open to
black students), and discussing basis of NAACPs litigation decisions). Prior to Gaines, the
Supreme Court had only decided one case involving race and education during the interwar
period. See Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 87 (1927) (upholding Mississippi's decision to
categorize Chinese-Americans as "colored" for the purposes of school segregation).
9 KAREN O'CONNOR, WOMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS' USE OF THE COURTS 26 (1980); see also
WASBY, supra note 28, at 160-61 (discussing how intergroup coordination is important at
every step of litigation process).
91 In order to present a theoretical framework sufficiently simple to be used as an
analytical tool, this Article elides historical considerations such as the extent to which
certain organizations carry special influence with Supreme Court Justices in excess of their
market power over an area of law. An account of the political economy of criminal litigation
that responsibly accounted for such nuances would require a detailed historical
investigation into the extent to which the Supreme Court has historically relied on the
expertise of certain litigation organizations to determine the merits of certain constitutional
positions. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme
Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1487 (2008)
(examining the influence of the current Supreme Court bar); see also Nancy Morawetz,
Counterbalancing Distorted Incentives in Supreme Court Pro Bono Practice:
Recommendations for the New Supreme Court Pro Bono Bar and Public Interest Practice
Communities, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 2011) (exploring the effect of the
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political economy of criminal litigation and constitutional
lawmaking exist in a mutually constitutive relation to one
another. A constitutional decision made by the Supreme Court
may cause changes in the political economy of criminal litigation
that dramatically alter the extent to which impact litigation
organizations can control the market for a given set of
constitutional claims. Such changes in the political economy of
criminal litigation can, in turn, catalyze shifts in criminal
procedure doctrine that the Court may not have anticipated at the
time of its earlier decision. By accounting for this inter-dynamic
process, the framework presented here can shed light on aspects of
constitutional criminal procedure's doctrinal development that are
otherwise puzzling.
III. UNDERSTANDING DOCTRINAL SHIFTS

This Part applies the framework presented above to examine
how changes in the political economy of litigation-precipitated in
part by Gideon-influenced the post-Warren Court shift toward a
conservative criminal procedure doctrine that has narrowed the
protections accorded to suspects and defendants, and severed the
historical link between criminal procedure and race. 92 To
contextualize these doctrinal shifts, this Part reviews the role
organizations such as the NAACP played in the criminal
procedure cases in the 1920s and 1930s in which the Supreme
Court created new constitutional rules governing state procedure.
This Part then addresses a phenomenon that other scholars have
Supreme Court pro bono bar on public interest litigation strategies). Also required would
be a discussion of the relevance of an organization's cultural and political influence to its
power to transform the Supreme Court's agenda. Cf. Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional
Culture, Social Movement Conflict and ConstitutionalChange: The Case of the de facto ERA,
94 CAL. L. REv. 1323, 1366-76 (2006) (exploring how the National Organization of Women
The assumptions underlying the
shaped popular constitutional understandings).
framework presented here, however, reflect the realities of contemporary criminal
procedure litigation with sufficient accuracy to enrich our understanding of the influences
that shape constitutional criminal procedure. For example, while interest groups such as
the ACLU and the NAACP may have once had influence with the Supreme Court that
extended beyond their market power, those organizations are no longer members of the elite
Supreme Court bar that, according to Richard Lazarus, disproportionately influence the
agenda of today's Supreme Court. Lazarus, supra,at 1530-31.
92 For sources documenting the conservative shift, see supranote 4.
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documented-the extent to which the proliferation in legal service
organizations caused by Gideon catalyzed the criminal procedure
revolution-and identifies a separate phenomenon those scholars
have overlooked-the extent to which the proliferation of these
organizations limited the power of any one organization to guide
the Supreme Court's criminal procedure agenda.
A. EARLY DOCTRINE

The structural conditions that enable public interest
organizations to shape the Supreme Court's agenda were once
features of the criminal procedure landscape. As discussed above,
the ideological leanings of Supreme Court Justices in the 1920s
and 1930s would not, at first blush, make them amenable to
brushing aside federalism concerns to reverse state court criminal
convictions.93 During this period, the NAACP, in conjunction with
the ACLU and other public interest organizations, impelled the
Court to create new rules of constitutional criminal procedure by
presenting it with four cases involving horrific and high-profile
instances of racial injustice. 94 The defendants in each case were
appointed attorneys on either the day of their trials or the day
before.95 The trials in these cases took place shortly after the
alleged crimes occurred and were conducted under the threat of
mob violence if the defendants were not sentenced to death. 96 In
two of the cases, Moore v. Dempsey and Brown v. Mississippi, the
defendants had been tortured into giving confessions.97 There was,
at the very least, serious doubt in these cases-"not just with the
aid of historical hindsight, but at the time of the trial-as to
93 See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
9 See supra note 13 (listing cases); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of
Identity-Based Social Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100
MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2202-06 (2002) (discussing the idea that the NAACP was pushing "a
constitutionalcode of nationalcriminalprocedure"). For a detailed description of each case
and events leading to it, see DAN T. CARTER, SCoTTSBORo: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN

SOUTH 3-50 (rev. ed. 2007) (delving into the Scottsboro cases); CORTNER, supra note 17, ch.
1 (exploring Moore v. Dempsey); RICHARD C. CORTNER, A "SCOTTSBORO" CASE IN MISSISSIPPI:
THE SUPREME COURT AND BROWN V.MISSISSIPPI ch. 1 (1986) [hereinafter CORTNER, BROWN]
(discussing Brown v. Mississippi).
95 Klarman, supra note 18, at 52.
9 Id.
9 Id.
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whether any of the defendants was in fact guilty."98 The innocence
of the defendants in the Scottsboro cases, Powell v. Alabama and
Norris v. Alabama, was especially apparent (at least from the
perspective of Northerners and Southern blacks), and the trials in
those cases drew the sustained attention of the national press. 99
The political economy of litigation of the 1920s and 1930s
partially accounts for why these cases were the ones that framed
the Court's decisions concerning what evidence is necessary to
establish that blacks were unlawfully excluded from juries,100
whether due process forbids mob-dominated trials' 0 ' or confessions
obtained through torture,102 and whether due process requires the
appointment of counsel in capital cases involving ignorant
During this period, there were few criminal
defendants.103
procedure petitions being filed, and even fewer challenging state
court convictions. Prior to 1932, when the Supreme Court held in
Powell v. Alabama that the due process clause guaranteed
indigent defendants the right to counsel in capital cases,104 only
one state (Nevada) had a policy in place to provide counsel to
defendants in felony cases. 05 In this era, an impact litigation
organization with the resources to litigate a constitutional
98 Id.

99 See CARTER, supra note 94, at 135 ("During the summer of 1931, for many Americans,
the Scottsboro Case became almost a talisman, a symbol of the daily injustice Southern
whites inflicted upon the Negroes of the region."); JAMES GOODMAN, STORIES OF
ScoTTsBORO, at xi-xii (1994) (noting differing opinions as to the Scottsboro defendants'
innocence between Southern whites and the rest of the population); id. at 87-89, 147-51
(discussing press coverage of Scottsboro cases); Klarman, supra note 18, at 52 n.13
(discussing obvious innocence of Scottsboro defendants); see also GENE ROBERTS & HANK
KLIBANOFF, THE RACE BEAT: THE PRESS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE, AND THE AWAKENING

OF A NATION 122 (2006) (noting that an editor of the progressive Montgomery Advertiser
"had taken up the cause of the Scottsboro Boys").
100 See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 599 (1935) (finding a "violent presumption" of
unlawful exclusion when African Americans were uniformly disqualified from juries based
on intelligence, experience, or moral integrity).
101 See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923) (finding a right to a habeas petition
when verdict is produced by mob domination).
102See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S..278, 287 (1936) (holding that murder convictions
cannot rest solely on confessions obtained by officers of the state through torture).
10 See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (finding a duty under due process to
assign counsel when, in a capital case, the defendant is incapable of finding counsel
himself).
10 Id.
105 Epp, ExternalPressure,supra note

11, at 273 tbl.12.1.
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criminal procedure case stood an excellent chance of capturing the
Supreme Court's attention, no matter what case it chose to take.
During the October 1931 term, when the Supreme Court accepted
the certiorari petition in Powell, 06 only 738 certiorari petitions
were filed; only 44 of those petitions involved claims of due process
or equal protection "Relating to Procedure," such as the claim at
issue in Powell, and only 6 of those petitions were granted. 0 7 So
uncommon was the Supreme Court's intervention on behalf of the
Scottsboro Boys in Powell that it prompted the following caveat by
(then-professor) Felix Frankfurter and James M. Landis:
"However reassuring is such an invocation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to protect outcast or unpopular minorities, it is an
assertion of a power at best intermittent, remote, and adapted only
to redress violations of the minimum decencies of judicial
procedure." 08
Second, during that era, only a few organizations sought to
occupy the field of constitutional criminal procedure, and they
were able (and, generally, willing) to coordinate with each other.
In the 1920s and 1930s, there were a handful of prominent civil
rights organizations that dominated the area of constitutional
criminal procedure, one of which-the NAACP (and then the
NAACP-LDF)-strove to use constitutional criminal procedure to
redress racial inequality. 09 As one of the only organizations with
106 See CARTER, supra note 94, at 160 (noting that the Supreme Court agreed to hear
Powell in May 1932).
107 Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October
Term, 1931, 46 HARV. L. REV. 226, 243 tbl.VII (1932). An additional forty-one petitions
involved "Bill of Rights" claims according to Frankfurter's and Landis's classification
system, and could have thus included criminal procedure claims arising out of federal cases.
Id. at 242 tbl.VII.
10 Felix Frankfurter & Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Business of the Supreme Court at October
Term, 1932, 47 HARV. L. REV. 245, 277 (1933).
109 The NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund (LDF) was established in 1939 as the
litigation arm of the NAACP after the IRS refused to grant tax deductibility to NAACP
contributions because of its lobbying activities. The LDF served as the NAACP's litigation
arm, and the distinctions between the two entities were merely formal ones during the
years discussed here. See WASBY, supra note 28, at 61 (recognizing that the LDF and
NAACP "were located in the same building, had interlocking boards of directors and shared
staff, and LDF was the NAACP's litigation arm'). This Article treats the organizations as a
single entity in discussing events that occurred prior to 1957, when the organizations
separated their boards of directors. Id. at 62.
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the resources and will to advance this understanding of criminal
procedure, the organization was free to select the most
sympathetic defendants to advance the cause. Accordingly, the
organization selected cases involving defendants it believed to be
innocent.110 The ACLU was perhaps even more prominent a
player in the area of criminal procedure, having undertaken an
"aggressive plan of expansion" beginning in 1929.111 These
organizations, however, coordinated with one another so as not to
undermine their respective agendas. In the 1920s, the head of the
ACLU, Roger Baldwin, and the executive secretary of the NAACP,
James Weldon Johnson, were both directors of the American Fund
for Public Service (colloquially, the "Garland Fund"), and in this
capacity had committed themselves to the common aim of
mobilizing the working class around a civil rights agenda.112 The
organizations worked together so closely that, by the 1940s,
Baldwin had developed an "unwritten rule" of referring all "negro
cases" to the LDF, and in 1944 met with Thurgood Marshall to
discuss the division of work between the organizations and ensure
that the ACLU would not interfere with the NAACP-LDF's
desegregation strategy.113
The extent to which the NAACP-LDF's cooperation with other
organizations enabled it to inform the Supreme Court's view of
criminal procedure is illustrated by the Court's early selfincrimination cases. In Brown v. Mississippi,the Supreme Court
110See KLARMAN, supra note 12, at 156 ('The NAACP, to preserve its credibility, would
not take criminal cases unless it was convinced of the defendants' probable innocence.");
MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME

COURT, 1936-1961, at 51 (1994) (noting that NAACP litigators believed the defendants they
represented were "innocent of all charges"). In the 1940s, Thurgood Marshall, stressing the
NAACP-LDF's policy with regard to criminal cases, would ask his staff: "How can we justify
taking hard-earned nickels and dimes to defend a vicious killer?" Id. at 40.
nll STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE
FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 28 (2008); see also WASBY, supra note 28, at 65 (acknowledging

that the ACLU was perhaps most recognized for its engagement in civil rights litigation);
Epp, External Pressure,supra note 11, at 266 (discussing the ACLU's significant impact on
the Court's constitutional litigation agenda in the 1920s and 1930s).
112 See TUSHNET, supra note 110, at 11-12 ("Garland[, John, backer of the Garland fund]
and Baldwin combined interest in mobilizing the working class with an interest in civil
liberties and civil rights, mainly because they believed that agitation to secure civil rights
was a useful organizing technique.").
11 Id. at 44.
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reversed the convictions of three black sharecroppers who had
been tortured into falsely confessing to the murder of their white
landlord.114 The defendants' torture was so severe, and the
evidence of their innocence so compelling, that the NAACP was
able to quietly finance the litigation in conjunction with a liberal,
Southern organization,"15 and a former Mississippi governor
argued the case before the Court." 6 The case posed a significant
doctrinal challenge, since in 1908 the Court held that the Fifth
Amendment's self-incrimination privilege did not extend to the
states." 7 But if the law was difficult, the equities were not: the
record included a deputy sheriffs horrific response during crossexamination to the question whether he beat the defendants: "Not
too much for a negro; not as much as I would have done if it was
left to me.""" The Court was, according to observers, "visibly
shocked" as the defendants' attorney spoke of torture used to
extract their confessions." 9 Moved by these facts, the Court
significantly modified its prior interpretation of the Fifth
Amendment and held that admission of the confessions would
offend a "principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."120
Thus, by funding a case that it did not litigate, and by
coordinating with a white, Southern organization, the NAACP was
able to propel a case to the Supreme Court that reshaped the selfincrimination clause to confront the realities of racially
discriminatory policing. The Court soon expanded Brown in
114

297 U.S. 278, 279, 287 (1936); see also CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 94, at 136

(summarizing the significance of the Court's holding); KLARMAN, supra note 12, at 129
("Incredibly, the deputy sheriff admitted torturing the defendants to confess .... Moreover,
the convictions of the defendants depended almost entirely on their confessions.").
115 This organization was the Commission on Interracial Cooperation (CIC).
See
CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 94, at 94 (recognizing the NAACP contributed $690 for
litigation through the CIC).
116 See id. at 65, 128 (noting that ex-Governor Earl Leroy Brewer argued the case in front
of the Supreme Court on January 10, 1936).
n1 See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 117 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(summarizing the holding of the Court that "a State can compel a person accused of a crime
to testify against himself' without violating the Constitution).
11 CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 94, at 28.
119

Id. at 128.

Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 (1936) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
120
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another case litigated by the NAACP-LDF, Chambers v. Florida,
where it held that four black defendants' confessions to the murder
of a white man were unconstitutionally coerced regardless whether
the defendants had been physically abused.121 As in Brown, the
confession in Chambers was the only evidence of the defendants'
guilt, and there was strong suspicion that the defendants were
innocent.122 These cases involved facts that not only elicited the
Justices' sympathies, but also spared them from confronting the
difficult question of whether the Constitution forbade coercive
interrogations because they were unreliable or because they
violated the defendant's dignity.123 Accordingly, by coordinating
with other actors and selecting cases with the most attractive
facts, the NAACP-LDF was able to reshape the self-incrimination
privilege and, at least for a time, make the privilege interwoven in
the Justices' minds with the need to protect minorities against
systemic abuse.124
On the occasions where the NAACP-LDF failed to coordinate
with other organizations, it was often due to strategic competition
between them, which impelled the organizations to push the Court
even more aggressively. In the Scottsboro Boys cases,125 for
example, the NAACP was initially reluctant to intervene on behalf
of the defendants, whose innocence was not initially apparent to
the organization.126 The International Labor Defense (ILD), which
was affiliated with the Communist Party-USA, seized on the
NAACP's reticence, served as counsel for the defendants, and
121 See 309 U.S. 227, 239 (1940) (applying Brown v. Mississippi to find compulsion in
obtaining the confessions).
122 KLARMAN, supra note 12, at 228.
123 See id. at 229 (discussing the Justices' concerns about coerced confessions and
describing the defendants' interrogations in which they were denied food, sleep, and contact
with family and lawyers). The Court would soon confront this issue in a series of more
divided cases that cannot easily be reconciled. See id. at 229-30 (analyzing Lyons v.
Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596 (1944) and Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942)).
124 See Chambers,309 U.S. at 241 ("Under our constitutional system, courts stand against
any winds that blow as havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because they
are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-conforming victims of prejudice
and public excitement").
125 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
126 The NAACP chapter closest to where the defendants were being tried had collapsed the
previous year, and the organization thus lacked on-the-ground intelligence about the case
and had to rely on reports of Southern newspapers. See CARTER, supranote 94, at 52.
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launched a vigorous publicity campaign on their behalf. 127 Stung
with criticism for their impassiveness, the NAACP, in cooperation
with the ACLU, struggled to take over the defendants'
representation.128 Although they initially failed in these efforts,
their sustained interest in the case kept it in the public eye, and
the ILD agreed to allow an eminent ACLU-affiliated lawyer,
Walter Pollak, argue the case before the Supreme Court.129 What's
more, competition from left-wing organizations reinvigorated the
NAACP's and ACLU's efforts to control the litigation of defendants
in other cases.130
B. ECONOMIC AND DOCTRINAL SHIFTS

Neither close coordination nor strategic competition in criminal
procedure cases was easy to maintain in subsequent decades,
however. Following the Court's 1932 decision in Powell, states
went beyond the Court's holding to guarantee court-appointed
counsel to indigent defendants in all felony cases. By the late
1950s only six -states (four of them Southern) made counsel
available only in capital cases.' 3 ' In addition to these state-driven
127

ROBIN D.G. KELLY, HAMMER AND HOE: ALABAMA COMMUNISTS DURING THE GREAT

DEPRESSION 78-79 (1990) (observing that "Communist-led ILD" gave the Scottsboro

defendants unsolicited assistance with the intention of gaining international attention).
128 See CARTER, supra note 94, at 71-72 (describing the NAACP's meeting with the
defendants and their promise to provide "the best attorney in Alabama"); GOODMAN, supra
note 99, at 37 ("The Communists couldn't do better than [attorney Clarence] Darrow, but
the NAACP couldn't defend the boys without their consent, and by the late fall of 1931 the
boys all backed the ILD."); KELLEY, supranote 127, at 80-81 ("mhe paralyzed state of the
NAACP in Alabama and the overall timorousness of Birmingham's black elite precluded
any local intervention.").
129 See CARTER, supra note 94, at 160 ("Despite their outspoken disdain for the legal
processes, ILD officials retained Walter Pollak, one of the nation's most eminent
constitutional attorneys."). Following the victories in Powell and Norris, the NAACP took
over representation of several of the defendants. See id. at 411-13 (discussing the NAACPs
representation of some of the Scottsboro defendants while in front of the Alabama Parole
Board).
130 See, e.g., KELLEY, supra note 127, at 83-91 (describing the NAACP's and ILD's
competition over the representation of Willie Peterson, a black man accused of rape and
murder); Rebecca Roiphe, Lawyering at the Extremes: The Representationof Tom Mooney,
1916-1939, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1731, 1747-52 (2009) (discussing the ACLU's and ILD's
roles in Mooney v. Halohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (per curiam)).
131 Epp, External Pressure,supra note 11, at 272-73 & tbl.12.1. The four Southern states
were Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, and South Carolina. Id. at 273 tbl.12.1.
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initiatives, the Ford Foundation began to offer extraordinary
support to a number of legal aid organizations beginning in the
early 1950s.132 Just three months before the Court's decision in
Gideon, the Foundation approved a $2.4 million grant to the
National Legal Aid and Defender Organization to create model
defender services and establish new defenders officers in major
cities. 33 A year after the Court's decision, the Foundation
"invested an additional $2 million to 'take full advantage of the
tide of interest in defender services resulting from the Gideon
case.' "134 Complementing this massive investment of resources,
the American Bar Association immediately responded to Gideon by
setting up a committee to survey legal aid services in each state,135
and in 1964 issued a declaration insisting that state and local bar
associations should make it a priority to train lawyers for indigent
Between 1957 and 1966, government-appointed
defense. 36
lawyers represented a significant proportion of criminal
defendants before the Supreme Court.'37 Moreover, during this
same period, the number of certiorari petitions in criminal cases
increased by approximately 88%.138
This expansion of support for indigent defense in the early
1960s provided the structural underpinnings for Warren Court
132 See id. at 272 (categorizing the Ford Foundation's contributions to numerous civil
liberties organizations, totaling over $47 million); TELES, supranote 111, at 34-35 (noting
the Ford Foundation's grants).
133 TELES, supranote 111, at 34.
13 Id. (quoting FORD FOUND., FORD FOUNDATION ANNUAL REPORT 23 (1964)).
1a5 Id. at 31.
136 Id. at 32.
1' EPP, RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supranote 11, at 60.
138 See GERHARD CASPER & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT
36 tbl.3.3 (1976) (showing that the number of criminal cases on the Supreme Court's docket
grew from 908 in 1957 to 1,708 in 1966); cf. id. at 32-33 (defining the Supreme Court's
docket as "consist[ing] of those applications for review ... in which the applicant submits a
printed petition for certiorari (or its counterpart in appeal cases, a 'jurisdictional
statement) in accordance with the usual requirements of the Supreme Court's rules, which
include a filing fee," or where "the requirement of a printed submission and filing fee is
waived because of the applicant's poverty"). Moreover, by 1973, the number of certiorari
petitions filed in criminal cases had increased by about 83% since the Court's decision in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See CASPER & POSNER, supra, at 36 tbl.3.3
(showing that the number of criminal cases on the Supreme Court's docket grew from 1,399
in 1963 to 2,566 in 1973); see also Epp, External Pressure,supranote 11, at 258, 273 tbl.12.1
(representing the Court's high percentage of criminal procedure cases, generally over 20%).
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The
decisions expanding criminal procedure rights.139
proliferation of organizations committed to representing poor
defendants substantially decreased the likelihood, however, that
any single organization could significantly constrain the Supreme
Consistent with this
Court's criminal procedure agenda.140
development, many of the significant Warren-era criminal
procedure cases were not litigated by public interest organizations,
but were instead "the unintended by-product of the activities of
attorneys who provided the Court with occasions to make policy
but who were themselves relatively uninterested in policy."141
Impact litigation organizations were involved in only three of these
cases prior to the Court's decision to grant certiorari in them, and
only two of those cases were brought by lawyers affiliated with
impact litigation organizations.142 The remaining cases were not
139 See EPp, RIGHTS REVOLUTION, supra note 11, at 65-69 (noting that the increase in
state right-to-counsel policies allowed government sponsored attorneys to reach the
Supreme Court in criminal procedure cases that the Court would never have previously
heard).
14o This analysis, it should be noted, does not account for the extent to which, perhaps
because of its expertise or credibility, the NAACP-LDF was more successful than other
litigants in the field at filing certiorari petitions that received the Court's attention. Cf.
DORIS MARIE PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 98 (1980)
(stating that between 1945 and 1957, the Court granted certiorari in over half the cases
where Thurgood Marshall was the attorney of record).
141 JONATHAN D. CASPER, LAWYERS BEFORE THE WARREN COURT: CIVIL LIBERTIES AND
CIVIL RIGHTS 7 (1972). Casper interviewed attorneys who argued in eighty-two cases before
the Warren Court, twenty-eight of which were criminal procedure cases. Id. at 96 tbl.6. His
study revealed that, in contrast to the vast majority of cases in other subareas of
constitutional law, criminal procedure cases were predominately argued by attorneys who
were not affiliated with an impact litigation organization and who were primarily motivated
by winning a victory for their client without regard to the broader policy ramifications of the
case. See id. at 96, 105-07 ("[T]welve [attorneys] were appointed to represent indigent
defendants, eight received their cases by referral from another attorney, one was
representing a previous client, three received cases as a result of their affiliation with
institutions or groups, and four had social or friendship ties with their clients.").
142 The ACLU filed an amicus brief in support of the petition for certiorari in Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Brief of Amicus Curiae, American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio in
Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Terry, 392 U.S. 1 (No. 67). In Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), Richard Sobol of the Lawyers Constitutional Defense
Committee (LCDC) represented the defendant from the trial phrase through oral argument
in the United States Supreme Court. See id. at 145; see also Nancy J. King, Duncan v.

Louisiana: How Bigotry in the Bayou Led to the Federal Regulation of State Juries, in
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 261, 267 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (stating that Richard
Sobel joined the New Orleans office of the LCDC after taking a leave of absence from Arnold
and Porter in Washington, D.C.). In Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), after the lead

760

GEORGIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 45:721

test cases brought to reshape the Court's criminal procedure
interpretations, but were instead litigated pro se,143 or by lawyers
for whom the basis of the Court's holding was incidental to the
objective of reversing their clients' convictions.144 The Court's
composition during the Warren era, and the overall liberalism of
its criminal procedure decisions during that period, thus appear to
have obscured the extent to which its decision in Gideon
diminished the ability of impact litigation organizations to shape
the Court's agenda.145
As the Court's composition began to shift in the coming decades,
and Justices with more conservative ideological formations took
the bench, impact litigation organizations appear to have had little
control over the litigation of significant Supreme Court criminal
procedure cases. The NAACP-LDF, for example, remained an
active player in areas of criminal procedure with obvious racial
dimensions, but remained so primarily by filing amicus briefs in
cases the Court had already accepted for review.146 There are also
petitioner unsuccessfully attempted to file a pro se certiorari petition, the ACLU secured a
lawyer for him who filed a new petition on his behalf. See LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME,
LAW AND POLITICS 61-63 (1983) (discussing the ACLU's search for counsel and the

organization finding John J. Flynn to represent Miranda).
143 See, e.g., Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335 (indicating Court appointment of attorney for
petitioner).
144 See, e.g., Terry, 392 U.S. 1; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Miranda,384
U.S. 436; Gideon, 372 U.S. 335; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961); see also CASPER, supra note 141, at 96, 105-07 (stating that criminal
advocates are typically more concerned with a favorable decision for their client); ef. WASBY,
supra note 28, at 30-35 (acknowledging that litigation groups have multiple goals which
might prevent a litigation organization from undertaking some cases).
145 Cf. Lain, supra note 5, at 1378 & n.97 (noting that the Warren Court became
"decidedly liberal in composition" following Justice Goldberg's appointment in 1962).
146 See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of the Brennan Center for Justice et al. in Support of
Petitioner, Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191 (2008) (No. 07-440) (addressing when
right to counsel attaches); Brief Amicus Curiaeof the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational
Fund, Inc. in Support of Petitioner, Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (No. 066330) (addressing sentencing court's consideration of Guideline disparities between
sentences for crack and cocaine); Brief for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund,
Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000)
(No. 98-1036) (contending that flight from police does not in itself establish likelihood of
criminal activity); Brief Amici Curiae of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund,
Inc. et al., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (No. 84-6263) (arguing that use of
peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from jury violates the Sixth Amendment and Equal
Protection Clause); cf. WASBY, supranote 28, at 178 (noting that during the late 1980s and
early 1990s the NAACP-LDF "slate[d] the criminal justice area for particular concern").
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cases in recent decades in which the organization represented
criminal defendants before the Supreme Court, but only assumed
this role after the Court had granted certiorari. 147 In contrast to
its role in earlier decades, however, the NAACP-LDF has, in
recent decades, represented criminal defendants in only a few
cases in which the organization has filed a successful certiorari
petition. All but one of these cases, moreover, involved issues
unique to the litigation of death penalty cases.148 Numerous
factors no doubt played a role in the NAACP-LDF's relative
inactivity in contemporary Supreme Court criminal procedure
litigation, including the organization's reluctance to pursue cases
that would make bad precedent with a Supreme Court generally
regarded as conservative with regard to criminal issues. 149
Notwithstanding these factors, the NAACP-LDF's lack of control
over the Supreme Court's criminal procedure cases illustrates that
the organization no longer operates in a litigation environment
147 See, e.g., House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) (challenging procedural bar to federal
habeas relief with evidence of actual innocence); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)
(challenging imposition of death penalty on aider and abettor to robbery in course of which
murder is committed by another).
14s See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987) (holding that study showing racial
disparity in imposition of death penalty does not indicate that jury in defendant's case acted
with discriminatory purposes); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986) (holding that
"death qualification" of a jury does not violate the fair cross-section requirement of the Sixth
Amendment or the right to a fair and impartial jury); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 87879 (1983) (holding that invalidation of one statutory aggravating circumstance does not
require death penalty to be vacated when jury expressly found two other valid statutory
aggravating circumstances); Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410, 416 (1982) (certifying question
to Georgia Supreme Court to explain premises behind state law that the invalidity of one
among plurality of statutory aggravating circumstances found by jury does not impair
imposition of death penalty); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462 (1981) (holding that
examining doctor's testimony of defendant's future dangerousness violated Fifth
Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination when testimony was based upon
pretrial psychiatric examination and defendant had not been informed that statements
made to doctor could be used against him in subsequent capital sentencing proceeding); cf.
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985) (holding in civil case that use of deadly force to
seize fleeing suspected felon is unreasonable unless necessary to prevent escape and there
is probable cause to believe the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious
physical injury to the officer or others). For an account of the NAACP-LDF's and ACLU's
coordinated strategy in the 1960s and the 1970s to eliminate capital punishment, see

Michael Meltsner, LitigatingAgainst the Death Penalty: The Strategy Behind Furman, 82
YALE L.J. 1111 (1973).
149 Cf. WASBY, supra note 28, at 30-31 (discussing the effect of perceived shifts in the
Court's ideology on NAACP-LDF litigation strategy).
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where it can coordinate with other organizations to control which
cases will find themselves on the Court's docket. 50
This diminished control has allowed a Court that is
uncomfortable with the connection between criminal procedure
and race to sidestep the issue when addressing criminal procedure
questions that have significant racial dimensions. In Atwater v.
City of Lago Vista, for example, the Court held that the Fourth
Amendment permits police officers to make warrantless arrests for
minor criminal offenses, including misdemeanors punishable only
by a fine.' 5 ' The case involved a white, middle-aged mother, Gail
Atwater, who was pulled over in a suburb of Austin, Texas, while
driving her children home from soccer practice.152 But by granting
certiorari in this case, the Court took up a racially fraught
question; as the ACLU and the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers took pains to emphasize in amici briefs, a wealth
of evidence documented police officers' use of minor offenses as a
pretext for racially-targeted arrests for the purpose of searching
suspects (and their vehicles) for drugs. 53 The dissenting opinion
150 This shift in the political economy of litigation does not, of course, entirely explain why
the Court was attentive to the equal protection dimensions of modern criminal procedure in
the 1920s but no longer is today. The Court's early criminal procedure interventions to
address the worst abuses of criminal justice systems in the South were, as scholars have
shown, consistent with popular opinion. See KLARMAN, supra note 12, at 133 ("Most
Americans did not endorse farcical proceedings in which southern blacks, possibly or
probably innocent of the charges against them, were tortured into confessing and sentenced
to death after mob-dominated trials without the effective assistance of counsel."). Moreover,
in contrast to the racial segregation of social life, discrimination against blacks in the
criminal justice system was not a prerogative that white supremacists in the South highly
valued, and the Supreme Court's early criminal procedure interventions did not meet with
nearly the level of resistance as its desegregations decisions. See id. at 134 ("Many
southern whites intensely committed to segregation and opposed to interracial marriage did
not endorse the unfair treatment of black criminal defendants. For that reason, eminent
white lawyers represented black defendants . .. on appeal, when they never would have
taken cases challenging school segregation or disenfranchisement."); 1 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN
AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 60-61, 526-29, 534,
555-56 (7th ed. 1944) (describing the differences in racial discrimination in Northern and
Southern American societies and proffering a "rank order of discriminations" against blacks
in Southern society).

151532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001).
152

Gerald Torres, Translationand Stories, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1373 (2002).

153 See Brief Amici Curiae of the National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers & the Ass'n

of Federal Defenders in Support of the Petitioners at 10-14, Atwater, 532 U.S. 318 (No. 991408) ("The incentive to search cars for drugs has further led officers to disproportionately
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emphasized the impact the majority's holding would have with
regard to this racial profiling practice.154 The facts of Gail
Atwater's arrest, however, obscured the racial dimensions of the
case to a degree that permitted the majority to dismiss the
dissent's concern as "speculative" and to assert that "there simply
is no evidence of widespread abuse of minor-offense arrest
authority." 55
The political economy of litigation thus helps explain why a
generally conservative Court was moved to create new
constitutional criminal procedure rights in the 1920s and 1930s,
while another conservative Court was reluctant to do so from the
1970s onwards. Compare, for example, the genesis of the 1932
case that gave rise to the right to counsel, Powell v. Alabama,156
with that of the 1984 case that undermined it, Strickland v.
Washington. 57 In Powell, the ILD, acting through a respected civil
rights lawyer, presented the Court with sympathetic defendants
whom the Northern press-and, to some extent, the Southernstop and search minority motorists with no suspicion of wrongdoing beyond an ordinary
traffic violation."); Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union et al. in
Support of Petitioners at 6-11, Atwater, 532 U.S. 318 (No. 99-1408) ("Courts across the
country are increasingly recognizing claims based on the practice of racial profiling, as that
issue moves to the forefront of national consciousness.").
154 See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 372 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[A]s the . .. debate over racial
profiling demonstrates all too clearly, a relatively minor traffic infraction may often serve as
an excuse for stopping and harassing an individual.").
155 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353 n.25; cf. Leading Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 306, 342 n.63
(2001) ("[A]s a white, middle-class woman, Gail Atwater was a particularly poor example of
the harms of unchecked police discretion.").
156 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
167 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
For accounts of how Strickland has undermined the right to
counsel, see William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn:Doctrinaland Practical
Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 114-61 (1995)
(discussing the line of cases following Strickland to demonstrate the "illogical and
unworkable framework for evaluating whether the performance of defense counsel had
fallen below a constitutionally required minimum"); Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary
System, Advocacy, and Effective Assistanceof Counsel in CriminalCases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& Soc. CHANGE 59, 72-83 (1986) (arguing that Strickland's "strong presumption" of
attorney competence and failure to set minimum standards for defense counsel "virtually
mandates that reviewing courts find that most defense attorneys, no matter what they have
done or failed to do, are competent"); Russell L. Weaver, The Perilsof Being Poor:Indigent
Defense and Effective Assistance, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 435, 441-46 (2004) (discussing cases in
which the "assumption of competence" led courts to deem effective defense lawyers who had
no jury trial experience, little time to investigate and prepare for trial, and slept in the
courtroom).
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thought to be innocent. 58 These defendants were far more
attractive candidates for judicial solicitude than David Leroy
Washington, whose conviction the Court upheld in Strickland. On
a two-week crime spree, Washington stabbed a minister to death,
kidnapped a twenty-year-old student and stabbed him to death
after two days, stabbed a woman while forcing her three elderly
sisters-in-law to watch, and finally bound up and shot the sistersin-law in the head.159 He was represented by an attorney whom
the judge presiding over the post-conviction proceedings called
"one of the leading criminal defense attorneys in Dade County,"
and he consistently disregarded that attorney's advice.160
Washington argued that he received ineffective assistance at his
All of the lower courts held that
sentencing proceeding.161
Washington received effective assistance of counsel.162 The courts
disagreed, however, as to the standard of review for ineffective
assistance claims, and the Eleventh Circuit ultimately remanded
for the district court to review Washington's claim under a more
demanding standard than the State of Florida preferred,
prompting it to petition the Supreme Court.163 Strickland's case
thus provided Florida with an excellent vehicle for advancing a
narrow understanding of the right to effective counsel, and it is
unsurprising that, when considering Washington's predicament,
158

See supranote 99 and accompanying text.

159 Washington v. Strickland, 673 F.2d 879, 907-08 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), rev'd en banc,

693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), rev'd, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). For a more detailed
account of the facts, see David Cole, Gideon v. Wainwright and Strickland v. Washington:
Broken Promises,in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES, supranote 142, at 101, 108-09.
16o Cole, supra note 159, at 108-09.
161 Strickland,466 U.S. at 675.
162 Cole, supra note 159, at 110.
163 See Brief for the Petitioner at 67-84, Strickland, 466 U.S. 668 (No. 82-1554) ("The
reexamination of counsel's performance must therefore rest upon only fundamental fairness
and not upon a list of potential errors."); Cole, supra note 159, at 110 ('The Florida state
courts and the federal district court adopted one standard, a panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit set forth a different standard, and the Fifth Circuit en banc
imposed still a third test."). The Eleventh Circuit held that defense counsel must provide
"reasonably effective assistance given the totality of the circumstances," Washington v.
Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1250 (Former 5th Cir. 1982) (en banc), rev'd, 466 U.S. 668
(1984), and that if this standard is met the defendant has the burden of establishing
prejudice by showing that the ineffective assistance "worked to his actual and substantial
disadvantage." Id. at 1258 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982))
(internal quotation mark omitted).
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the Court was unmoved to adopt a strongly pro-defendant
standard for assessing ineffective assistance claims.'64
If civil libertarians were seeking a poster child for the right to
counsel, David Leroy Washington would not be their first choice.
Certainly the Supreme Court could have chosen a case with a
more sympathetic defendant "to consider the standards by which
to judge a contention that the Constitution requires that a
criminal judgment be overturned because of the actual ineffective
assistance of counsel."165 The same year the Eleventh Circuit
decided Strickland, for example, it applied the same ineffective
assistance standard in another death penalty case, Goodwin v.
Balkcom, where it held in the defendant's favor. 66 The defendant
in that case, Terry Lee Goodwin, was black, borderline mentally
retarded, and eighteen years old at the time of his crime.167 His
defense attorney refused to investigate jury selection procedures in
the county where the defendant was tried, even though "[s]uch an
examination would have revealed glaring disparities in racial and
gender representation," 68 and testified that he chose not to
challenge the racial compositions of the grand and petit jury pool
because he felt "community pressure" not to do So.169 On top of
this, Goodwin's attorney referred to him as a "little old nigger boy"

164 The Supreme Court likewise held that Washington received effective assistance of
counsel, and in doing so set forth a "highly deferential" standard for determining whether
an attorney's assistance is constitutionally adequate. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90. In
addition, the Court held that even if an attorney's assistance is ineffective, the defendant
has the burden of showing that there is a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694.
This two-pronged test for prevailing on an ineffective assistance claim has proved
exceedingly difficult to satisfy. See Weaver, supranote 157, at 441-46 (recounting the facts
of United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) and Burdine v. Johnson, 231 F.3d 950 (5th
Cir. 2000), to illustrate the difficulty of overcoming the "assumption of competence" that
Strickland requires in determining ineffective assistance claims); Joseph L. Hoffmann &
Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State CriminalJustice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV.
791, 811 (2009) ("A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in trial or appellate proceedings
was raised in about half of the 2384 noncapital cases the Vanderbilt-NCSC study assessed.
Only one of those claims was granted; that grant was later reversed.").
165 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684.
166 684 F.2d 794, 820 (11th Cir. 1982).
167 Id. at 796-97 &n.1.
168 Id. at 817.
169 Id. at 806-07.
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during his closing argument.170 Unsurprisingly, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that Goodwin did not receive effective assistance
of counsel and was prejudiced by his attorney's performance.' 7 '
Surprising from a strategic standpoint, however, is that-like the
State of Florida in Strickland-the State of Georgia petitioned the
Supreme Court to overturn this decision.172 The Supreme Court
rejected Georgia's petition in April 1983,173 and went on to accept
the State of Florida's petition just two months later.174
One need not be a legal realist to conclude the ineffective
assistance standard might be different today if, in 1984, the Court
had been considering Terry Lee Goodwin's representation rather
than David Leroy Washington's. Nor does one need to be a legal
realist to conclude that a conservative Supreme Court would not
have mandated the right to counsel in capital cases in 1932 if the
defendants whose lives were at stake were people like Washington
rather than the Scottsboro defendants. If one accepts these
premises, then one of the most constitutionally significant
differences between the Powell era and the Strickland era is the
ability of litigation organizations to use sympathetic cases to shape
the Court's jurisprudence. As explained above, the certiorari
petition in Powell stands out as an anomaly among the 738
petitions filed during the October 1931 term, and it was sure not to
escape the Court's attention.' 75 By contrast, there were 5,062
petitions the term the Court agreed to hear Strickland and
declined to hear Goodwin (2,352 of them filed pro se), a large
number of which concerned criminal justice issues,176 and some of
which-like those in Strickland and Goodwin-were filed by

Id. at 805 n.13.
Id. at 820.
172 See Goodwin v. Balkcom, 684 F.2d 794, 794 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1098 (Apr. 18, 1983) (No. 82-1409).
173 Id.
174 Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), cert. granted,462 U.S.
1105 (June 6, 1983) (No. 82-1554).
175 See supranotes 106-08 and accompanying text.
176 EPSTEIN ET AL., supranote 54, at 74 tbl.2-6; see also Margaret Meriwether Cordray &
Richard Cordray, The Supreme Court'sPlenaryDocket, 58 WAsH. &LEE L. REv. 737, 760-61
(2001) (noting that of the 1983-1985 Court terms, the vast majority of in forma pauperis
cases concerned criminal or habeas issues).
170
171
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states.'" In such a situation, public interest organizations have
very little control over whether the defendants who appear before
the Supreme Court, and who thereby influence the course of
constitutional criminal procedure, look like David Leroy
Washington or Terry Lee Goodwin.
C. LITIGATION TODAY

The present-day political economy of litigation continues to
place poor and minority defendants at a disadvantage in pushing
for changes in constitutional doctrine. 78 First, the number of
cases filed each year in the Supreme Court-8,159 in the 2009
Term (6,576 filed in forma pauperis)-would almost render futile
any attempt to shape the Supreme Court's criminal procedure
agenda by manipulating the sort of cases it is presented for
review. 79 Second, the organizational support for criminal defense
See supra notes 163, 172 and accompanying text.
This Article argues that the increase in supply of legal aid is a significant cause of
practitioners' diminishing influence over the Court's criminal procedure agenda.
Counterintuitively, it seems less likely that the breathtaking increase in demand for legal
aid-that is, the explosive growth in the incarceration rate over the past several decadesis a complementary reason for practitioners' decrease in power. In a detailed analysis of the
"explosive growth" in the Supreme Court's criminal procedure docket between 1956 and
1973, Gerhard Casper and Richard Posner showed that the rising incarceration rate had
little to do with the rise in the number of certiorari petitions filed. See CASPER & POSNER,
supra note 138, at 42 ("Mhe growth of the Court's criminal docket .... cannot be
attributed, save in small part, to the growth in the crime rate."); id. at 35-46 (explaining
that the growth in the criminal procedure docket was the result of the number of federal
criminal petitions, while the federal conviction rate had grown far slower than the state
conviction rate). But see Douglas A. Berman, A Capital Waste of Time? Examining the
Supreme Court's "Culture of Death," 34 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 861, 867 (2008) (erroneously
citing Casper and Posner for the proposition that there are "historical links between
increases in criminal convictions and increases in certiorari petitions from criminal
defendants"). More recently, two scholars have shown that, during the October 2006
Supreme Court term, state court convictions counted for only 31% of the criminal certiorari
petitions filed through counsel, and only 17% of criminal certiorari petitions filed pro se.
Shay & Lasch, supranote 67, at 249-50. However, prisoners in state prisons and county
jails accounted for all but 208,118 of the more than 1.6 million individuals who were
incarcerated in 2009. WEST ET AL., supra note 44, at 2 & tbl.1. (This figure "[ilncludes
prisoners under the legal authority of state or federal correctional officials with sentences of
more than 1 year, regardless of where they are held." Id.)
179 See John Roberts, 2010 Year-End Report of the FederalJudiciary,9 (2010), availableat
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2010year-endreport.pdf (describing the
composition of the Supreme Court's docket).
177
178
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litigation is as diffuse as ever. In 2007, there were 957 public
defender offices across the nation, employing more than 15,000
full-time equivalent litigating attorneys, most of which are funded
at the state and county level.'o While such disparities in funding
sources and organizational structures would make coordination
difficult under the best of circumstances, most of these
organizations operate under the worst of them. Most of these
organizations are underfunded,181 and thus have strong
disincentives against spending their resources on filing certiorari
petitions.182 Even when public defenders do decide to petition the
Supreme Court, their resource constraints preclude the option of
pursuing a risky and resource-intensive strategy of moving
forward a set of cases designed to reshape the Court's criminal
procedure agenda.183
18 LYNN LANGTON & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC DEFENDER
OFFICES, 2007-STATISTICAL TABLES 1-2, 5 tbl.1, 6 tbl.2a (2009), availableat http://bjs.ojp.

usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pdo07st.pdf.
181 See NAT'L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., supra note 39, at 52-70 (surveying a variety of
problems stemming from inadequate funding); STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT

DEFENDANTS, supra note 39, at 7-28 (describing lack of funding among other problems with
indigent defense in America).
182 See Shay & Lasch, supra note 67, at 254-62 (surveying the variety of reasons
defenders do not file certiorari petitions).
183 Although it is a separate consideration from the resources available for criminal
procedure litigation, it bears noting that the shifting standard of federal habeas review is
potentially another significant factor limiting the ability of impact litigation organizations
to control the Court's criminal procedure agenda. The Warren Court's expansion of the
scope and availability of habeas review created a wealth of opportunities for public interest
organizations to bring cases to the Court that would have otherwise escaped its attention.
Cf. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399 (1963) (holding that a state prisoner's failure to raise
federal constitutional claim in state appeal does not bar subsequent habeas review unless
the prisoner fails to exhaust remedies open in the state forum at the time an applicant files
for habeas relief); Hoffman & King, supra note 164, at 800-05 (discussing the Warren
Court's expansion of habeas review). The Court eliminated these opportunities with respect
to Fourth Amendment claims in 1976, see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 (1976) (holding
that a state prisoner cannot get federal habeas relief based on an unconstitutional search
when the state provided full and fair litigation), and severely curtailed them with respect to
other federal claims in the ensuing years. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1989)
(noting that the Sixth Amendment requires a fair cross-section for petit jury, but that this
did not apply retroactively to petitioner's case); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 748
(1991) (holding that failure to file timely notice of appeal in state proceedings may bar
federal habeas relief); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977) (holding that state
procedural defaults bar federal habeas relief absent showings of "cause" and "prejudice").
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.), now prevents federal
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Unsurprisingly, given the limited legal aid resources available
in most states, a disproportionately large number of criminal
certiorari petitions involve federal cases.1 8 Thanks to a laborious
survey that two scholars have recently published, we know that,
for the October 2006 Supreme Court term, federal criminal
convictions accounted for 50% of certiorari petitions that were filed
through counsel, and a startling 70% of the petitions that were
filed in forma pauperis.185 At the same time, inmates in federal
prisons accounted for less than one percent of those currently
incarcerated in this country. 186 There is little reason to think that
the criminal procedure issues raised by these federal defendants
are representative of those that arise in state cases. Federal
prosecutions are frequently the product of a resource-intensive
investigation that involves "sustained cooperation between"

courts from overturning state court decisions that are not "contrary to, or an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006). Except perhaps in the narrow area of
ineffective assistance claims in death penalty litigation (and only then by tacit
circumvention of the statutory standard), federal habeas no longer provides a forum for
impact litigation organizations to advance novel constitutional interpretations. Cf. Shay &
Lasch, supra note 67, at 228-46 (analyzing the barrier AEDPA has imposed on doctrinal
development through habeas).
Nevertheless, the current doctrine leaves open several other avenues for state court
litigants to present the Court with novel criminal procedure claims. The Supreme Court
has in the recent decade made new constitutional law, unbound by AEDPA's constraints,
both in reviewing direct appeals, see, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002)
(forbidding execution of the mentally retarded), and in directly reviewing state postconviction proceedings. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (forbidding
execution of individuals for crimes committed when they were minors); see also Shay &
Lasch, supra note 67, at 262-65 (discussing opportunities that direct state court appeals
and state post-conviction proceedings provide for creation of federal constitutional law). As
the framework presented in this Article demonstrates, however, the current political
economy of criminal litigation prevents impact litigation organizations from using these
procedural avenues to constrain the Supreme Court's criminal procedure agenda.
18 Shay &Lasch, supra note 67, at 249-50. Shay and Lasch argue that, in addition to the
resource constraints addressed above, there is a "cultural disconnect between state criminal
practice and certiorari practice in the Supreme Court" that accounts for the
disproportionately small number of petitions filed in state criminal cases. Id. at 252; see
also Lazarus, supra note 91, at 1560-61 (suggesting that the criminal defense bar is
culturally resistant to accepting expert assistance in cases before the Supreme Court).
15 See Shay & Lasch, supra note 67, at 249.
186 See WEST ET AL., supra note 44, at 2 tbl.1 (showing that federal prisoners constitute
only 208,118 of the more than 1.6 million sentenced prisoners incarcerated as of 2009).
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prosecutors and law enforcement officers.' 87 The run-of-the-mine
prosecutions of state law enforcement agencies, by contrast, do not
involve such investigations; the norm is instead for the police to
make their arrest, and then "to hand [the] case off to
prosecutors."188 Accordingly, the aspects of policing that are most
likely to have disparate impacts on the most politically
vulnerable-snap judgment calls about when to conduct a stop or
when to perform a search, for example-are less likely to be
salient in a federal case.189 The disproportionate number of federal
criminal cases on the Supreme Court's docket is therefore likely to
skew the institution's understanding of what's at stake for most
defendants when it expands or narrows a criminal procedure right.
IV. THE SHAPE OF REFORM
The theoretical framework presented in this Article has two
significant implications with respect to proposals to re-shift the
doctrinal foundations of criminal procedure. The first, and most
troubling, implication concerns the extent to which litigation can
be counted upon as a means of shaping judicial understandings of
constitutional criminal procedure. The second implication, which
offers more cause for optimism, is the possibility that structural
reforms may enable litigation organizations to influence the
Supreme Court's agenda even within the current political economy
of litigation.
A. THE PROBLEM OF LITIGATION REFORM

The understanding of constitutional criminal procedure's
doctrinal shifts that emerges from Parts II and III of this Article
exposes a potential weakness in proposals to reform criminal
procedure through new litigation strategies. Part III.A reviews a
1'
Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone'sRevenge: An Essay on the Political
Economy of PretextualProsecution,105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 615 (2005).
188 Id. at 602.
189 Cf. Shay & Lasch, supra note 67, at 242-43 ("Because the vast majority of criminal
cases in the U.S. are prosecuted in state courts, certain kinds of important federal
constitutional issues may arise more frequently - or nearly exclusively - in state court
criminal proceedings." (footnote omitted)).
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period during which impact litigation organizations had
considerable influence over the Court's constitutional criminal
procedure decisions. This influence is evidenced by the Court's
concern during that period with issues of racial equality and class
disparity in the administration of criminal justice. The current
political economy of litigation, however, cautions against drawing
too many hopeful lessons from that history.
Scholars have recently argued that state criminal defense
attorneys could better influence the shape of constitutional
criminal procedure by more frequently filing certiorari petitions
from direct appeals and state post-conviction proceedings. 90
These scholars acknowledge that indigent defendants' attorneys
may lack the resources to file effective certiorari petitions, but they
also identify a "cultural gap" between Supreme Court practice and
local criminal practice that discourages state criminal defense
attorneys from filing certiorari petitions as frequently as they
could.191 This insight is valuable; reform in state criminal
attorneys' certiorari practices could serve as an important first
step in shifting the Court's focus toward constitutional criminal
procedure issues that do not arise as frequently in federal cases.192
However, in terms of reshaping the doctrinal foundations of
constitutional criminal procedure in ways that will benefit the
most disadvantaged defendants, the limits of any reform in the
cultural practices of state criminal defense attorneys, absent
deeper structural reforms, are significant. 93 First, it is likely that
the only state criminal defense attorneys with the resources to
meaningfully reform their certiorari filing practices are those who
190 See id. at 262-63.
191

Id. at 261.

See supranotes 188-89 and accompanying text.
Richard Lazarus has identified one cultural practice, however, that if reformed, might
significantly affect the evolution of constitutional criminal procedure doctrine. Lazarus
asserts that the criminal defense bar is generally resistant to offers by experienced
Supreme Court litigators to assist in the preparation and argument of cases that the
Supreme Court accepts for review. See Lazarus, supra note 88, at 1560-61 (discussing
defense counsel's resistance to expert assistance); cf. Shay & Lasch, supra note 67, at 253
(noting that Lazarus offers no citation for his assertion and suggesting that "[wihether this
assertion is true, whether it applies uniformly to all Supreme Court experts, and whether
there is any legitimate basis for defenders' reluctance to surrender control of their clients'
cases are all questions that may be debated").
192
193
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represent paying clients.194 Thus, the new cases the Supreme
Court would confront as the result of a cultural reform in state
court filing practices may not be ones that draw the Court's
attention to how its constitutional decisionmaking affects poor and
minority defendants. Second, if a reform in certiorari filing
practices leads to a proliferation in petitions from state court
judgments, the Court will have even more opportunities to select
cases that conform to its ideological preferences. A boom in the
number of state court certiorari petitions will not only give the
Supreme Court more opportunities to accept the cases of
sympathetic defendants, but it will also increase the Court's
opportunities to select the cases of defendants who are obviously
guilty and whose crimes are particularly heinous. This is not to
say that the Court will always rule against the defendant in such
cases,195 but it does mean that the influence of litigants over future
Supreme Court decisionmaking will be limited compared to their
influence at the inception of the state law of constitutional
criminal procedure.
B. THE POTENTIAL FOR STRUCTURAL REFORM

The current political economy of litigation offers little cause for
hope that individual litigants will be able to radically transform
judicial understandings of constitutional criminal procedure. As
the framework presented in this Article demonstrates, a
proliferation in the number of litigation organizations creates
coordination problems that frustrate the ability of litigators to
The framework
constrain the Supreme Court's agenda. 96
on possible
shed
light
presented in this Article may, however,
structural reforms that would enable litigators to partially
overcome their coordination problems. For a solution to achieve
this reform goal, it must empower state criminal defense attorneys
to pool information about cases they are litigating that involve
federal constitutional claims. The solution must also create the

See supranotes 37-40 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 413 (2008) (forbidding imposition of the
death penalty for child rape).
196 See supraPart III.B.
194
'95
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possibility for litigators to choose which of those cases would have
the best possibility of pushing the Supreme Court toward a new
understanding of the constitutional right in question. As the
examples offered below illustrate, such solutions could emerge
from the decisions of courts or legislators, but may also be initiated
by private organizations.
1. Lawmaker-Driven Solutions. As explained above, the
political economy of criminal litigation and constitutional
The political economy of
lawmaking are inter-dynamic. 97
litigation can, as shown above, shape the trajectory of Supreme
Court decisionmaking.s98 At the same time, however, the Supreme
Court can effect significant changes in the political economy of
litigation through decisions such as Gideon v. Wainwright.99
Both the Court and legislatures can also impact the political
economy of criminal litigation by creating-or eliminatingprocedural opportunities for victims of constitutional violations to
pool their resources to redress rights. Current doctrine sharply
limits the opportunities for victims of criminal procedure
violations to use civil class actions as a means of redressing law
enforcement officers' violations of their criminal procedure
rights, 200 and essentially forecloses any civil opportunities to
vindicate violations of trial rights for those who have not been
acquitted or had their sentences vacated. 20 1 Any judicial or
(insofar as it is constitutionally permissible 202) legislative decisions
that broaden these opportunities could have a significant effect on
the political economy of criminal litigation. Similarly, as Brandon
Garrett has drawn to scholars' attention, courts could permit
197

See supraPart II.

19s See supraPart III.A.

372 U.S. 335 (1963); see supra PartIII.B.
See David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and
Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1226-28, 1235-41 (discussing doctrinal
barriers to civil class actions and suits for equitable relief for criminal procedure violations).
201 See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994) (barring civil suits challenging
conviction unless there has been an acquittal or vacatur); see also Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37, 53 (1971) (requiring federal courts to abstain from enjoining state prosecutions
except in extraordinary circumstances); Garrett, supra note 8, at 401 (discussing doctrinal
barriers to vindicating violations of trial rights).
202 Cf. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 (1983) (limiting injunctive relief for
civil rights violations under Article III standing doctrine).
199

200
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defendants to aggregate criminal procedure claims through
techniques such as consolidating habeas corpus petitions. 203 Such
procedural aggregation techniques, if the Supreme Court were to
sanction them, would allow defendants to "pool information about
the existence and causes of recurring [criminal procedure]
violations" and thus enable them to overcome coordination
problems to raise novel constitutional issues. 204 At the moment,
however, the idea of lawmaker-driven efforts to empower
defendants to push for new judicial understandings of criminal
procedure rights smacks of political fantasy.
2. Litigator-Driven Solutions. Even if such reforms are
politically unrealistic, it may nonetheless be possible for
organizations to develop grassroots solutions to overcome the
coordination problems caused by the political economy of
litigation. 205 Reformers could, for example, create a centralized,
information-sharing network-beginning with the construction of
a database-that would allow state criminal defense attorneys to
share information concerning the cases they are litigating which
raise federal constitutional issues. 206 Such a database could
categorize these cases by constitutional issue and include basic,
nonprivileged information concerning the facts of each case. Use
of such a database would allow attorneys to assess the relative
203 See Garrett, supra note 8, at 422-23 (discussing the Second Circuit's consolidation of
habeas petitions in Rudenko v. Costello, 286 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 2002), and the circuit's
subsequent reversal of that decision).
204 Id. at 388.
205 The activism of organizations representing the criminal defense bar-including the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the American Bar Association, the
National Association of Federal Defenders, and the National Legal Aid & Defender
Association-demonstrates that cooperation and networking among criminal litigators is
socially and economically feasible.
206 I am indebted to Daniel Richman for this suggestion. It should be noted that, while a
database of the sort proposed in this Article does not exist and does not seem to have been
publically proposed, the Center for Law and Social Policy and the National Legal Aid &
Defender Association have copublished a report, funded by the Open Society Institute and the
Ford Foundation, exploring more modest ways to use technology to improve legal aid

organizations' service to their clients. JULIA GORDON, CTR. FOR LAw AND Soc. PoLicY & NATL
LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N, EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DIGITAL REVOLUTION: USING
TECHNOLOGY TO MEET THE LEGAL NEEDS OF Low-INCOME PEOPLE (2002), availableat http:/

www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1036107299.97/digitaljdivide.pdf. Such initiatives show that
further studies exploring how to enhance coordination and information-pooling among
criminal litigators may garner financial support from private foundations.
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strength of one of their cases as a vehicle for raising novel
constitutional arguments.20 7 If an attorney had a case that
presented particularly promising facts for constitutional reform,
other lawyers could, if they chose, offer to support that attorney's
efforts to file a certiorari petition. 208
More controversially, an indigent defendant's attorney could
decide to ration the resources she is willing to invest raising a
constitutional claim in her own case if other cases exist that
Such
present better opportunities for shaping the law.
ethical
significant
two
raise
however,
would,
decisionmaking
questions. First, it is unclear whether, consistent with a lawyer's
duty to zealously advocate on her client's behalf, a lawyer may
forgo arguments with a poor chance of success on the merits in
order to raise those arguments in the future. 209 Second, an
attorney's decision to ration arguments on behalf of one client in
order to better shape the law on behalf of future clients suggests
that the attorney has impermissibly allowed herself to be
"materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another
client."210

207 Cf. Stephanos Bibas, PleaBargainingOutside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2532 (2004) (proposing the creation of a database of past trial and plea bargain
outcomes to increase prosecutors' and defense attorneys' access to information relevant to
plea negotiations).
208 This support structure for criminal defense lawyers litigating before the Supreme
Court may have a useful model in the National Association of Attorneys General's Supreme
Court Project, which was founded in 1982 to help state attorneys general present cases
effectively before the Supreme Court. See DAN SCHWEITZER & ANDREA M. HAMPTON, OYEZ
OYEZ OYEz: SERVICES OF THE NAAG SUPREME COURT PROJECT 6 (1996) (on file with author)
(describing the NAAG Supreme Court project's purpose and scope).
209 See MODEL RULES R. 1.3 cmt. 1 ("A lawyer must ... act ... with zeal in advocacy upon
the client's behalf."); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-1 (1983) ("The duty of a
lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client zealously within
the bounds of the law . . . .").
210 MODEL RULES R. 1.7(a) (providing, with exceptions that are irrelevant for purposes of
this decision, that "a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a
concurrent conflict of interest," and defining such a conflict to include cases where "there is
a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by
the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a
personal interest of the lawyer"); see also Etienne, supra note 56, at 1253, 1256 (concluding
that rationing of arguments to aid future clients constitutes an ethical conflict under Model
Rule 1.7(a)).
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Although a full exploration of these ethical questions is beyond
the scope of this Article, they should not necessarily inhibit the
consideration of litigator-driven efforts to overcome the
coordination problems posed to the criminal defense bar. As many
scholars have observed, the rationing of arguments on behalf of
indigent criminal defendants is an inevitable product of the
structure of criminal defense representation. 21 1 Given the resource
constraints of lawyers representing indigent defendants, and those
lawyers' statuses as repeat players in a system where they must
retain their credibility, they often must make difficult decisions
about whether to raise a complex constitutional argument in a
particular case. 212 Indeed, this sort of strategic rationing is
arguably built into the constitutional standard for ineffective
assistance claims, which requires courts to accord considerable
deference to the strategic decisions of attorneys concerning
whether to pursue a claim. 213
A database documenting the nature of state criminal cases
involving federal constitutional claims would allow defense
attorneys to make these decisions on an informed basis, instead of
resorting to snap judgments. This is not to suggest that the
ethical issues raised by proposing such a database are
insignificant, or that they would not need to be untangled if the
database were to be implemented. But the central ethical question
211 See Brown, supranote 41, at 810 (stating that underfunding of criminal defense leads
to rationing); Darryl K. Brown, Defense Attorney Discretion to Ration Services and
Shortchange Some Clients, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 207, 207 (2003) [hereinafter Brown, Defense
Attorney Discretion] (asserting that defense attoneys commonly give priority to some
clients); David Luban, Are CriminalDefenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1762-66
(1993) (discussing how resource constraints require public defenders to triage which clients
they aggressively defend).
212 See Brown, supra note 41, at 813-14 (describing the process by which indigent
defendants' attorneys make rationing decisions regarding expert assistance); Etienne, supra
note 56, at 1212-13, 1228 (reporting that some federal criminal defense attorneys adopt an
"impact litigation" approach to deciding which argument to raise and that they ration
arguments out of credibility concerns); see also supranotes 41-42 and accompanying text.
213 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (holding that "[judicial
scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential" and "must indulge a strong
presumption that . .. under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered
sound trial strategy'" (citation omitted)); Brown, Defense Attorney Discretion, supra note
211, at 214 (arguing that defense attorney rationing is "the sort of professional discretion
Stricklandstrongly protects").
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that the database would pose is not whether the technology
encourages defense attorneys to ration the arguments they make
on behalf of their clients, but whether the type of rationing that it
encourages is more problematic than other rationing principles
that have been suggested, such as the actual innocence of a
particular client.214 Even if limits were set on its use, however, the
database would nonetheless create the potential for criminal
defense attorneys to overcome some of the coordination problems
endemic to the current political economy of criminal litigation.
Such litigator-driven structural reforms represent only partial
solutions to the systemic coordination problems caused by the
political economy of criminal litigation. For example, even if the
criminal defense bar magically were able to ensure that only the
most sympathetic defendants filed certiorari petitions, the
Supreme Court would retain the discretion to select cases like
Strickland v. Washington in which the State files a certiorari
petition.215 These reforms could, however, ameliorate the worst
effects of the current litigation landscape on litigators' ability to
influence criminal procedure doctrine.
CONCLUSION

The current doctrinal foundations of contemporary criminal
procedure present a disturbing puzzle to scholars concerned with
racial and class disparities in the criminal justice system.
Incarceration is now the defining institutional experience of a
generation of economically disadvantaged black and Hispanic men,
while (statistically speaking) those who are either economically
prospect of
or white face little serious
advantaged
imprisonment. 2 1 6 As the population of socially disadvantaged
individuals caught within the criminal justice system has grown,
however, their influence in the process of constitutional
lawmaking has waned.

214 See Brown, Defense Attorney Discretion, supra note 211, at 215 (giving priority to
factual innocence over likelihood of success as the criteria for rationing).
215 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
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As this Article shows, providing each indigent defendant the
right to an attorney has not, as scholars once hoped, enabled those
defendants to reshape judicial understandings of the
Constitution's criminal procedure guarantees. This is not, of
course, an indictment of the right to counsel, which is undoubtedly
"fundamental and essential to a fair trial,"217 and perhaps one of
the Supreme Court's greatest constitutional achievements. But
the right to counsel has exacted at least some costs in terms of
allowing litigants to influence the Supreme Court's understanding
of constitutional criminal procedure. By exposing these costs, the
political economy framework presented in this Article can point
reforms toward developing ways to reduce them.

217

Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (quoting Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455,

465 (1942)).

